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ABSTRACT 
The increasing trends of integrated and concentrated broiler production results in a 
serious threat to environment through excessive litter production and lack of its proper disposal. 
Production concentration in limited area is a major source of surface as well as ground water 
pollution. Nonpoint source pollution from broiler litter applied on land remains a major concern 
in Louisiana and elsewhere in Southeastern USA. This study examines alternative approaches to 
reduce pollution originating from broiler production. First, I evaluate why some producers adopt 
BMP faster than others and what kind of factors affect the time to adoption decision. The 
duration model is employed to allow the censored observation while evaluating the impact of 
farm and individual specific characteristics on time to adoption decision. The information and 
awareness about the BMPs and the negative effects of broiler production on water-bodies are 
found to be the main factors to encourage the adoptions. Larger farmers are also the early 
adopters of BMPs. 
The existing literature finds voluntary BMP implementation serves only as 
complementary-instrument to economic-incentive-based approaches. Therefore, the option of 
economic-incentive based approach to mitigate water pollution becomes crucial. I evaluate the 
factors associated with the incentive level that motivates broiler producers to either terminate the 
production practices or pay pollution abatement costs so as to reduce pollutant entering water 
resources. I attempt to answers the question of “what is the minimum amount that a broiler 
producer is willing to accept to forgo the production practice so as to reduce pollution 
generation”. It is found that broiler producers are willing to terminate production only if the 
government payment is very high as compared to the profit from the production. However, the 
x 
 
producer’s willingness to pay pollution abatement tax is comparatively small, if they were to pay 
to mitigate the water pollution at their current production technology.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Rapid growth on broiler production and its spatial concentration have been a serious issue 
due to the negative environmental consequences originating from excessive litter production 
(Glover, 1996; Wastenberger and Dedson, 1995). The concentration of broiler production 
exacerbates the level of litter1 application in the broiler production areas (Glover, 1996). Broiler 
litter, when applied on land improperly and in excessive amounts2, causes higher nutrients 
concentration in soil which eventually results in leaching and surface runoff into the water-
bodies (Kingery et al., 1994). In addition, the lack of perfectly operating litter markets results in 
a repetitive application exacerbating the nutrient buildup, runoff, and leaching (Sharpley et al., 
2004) – causing externalities to other inhabitants in the region. 
Excess nitrogen may leach into ground water causing risk to human health, or runoff to 
the coastal waters causing hypoxia, whereas the phosphorus (the main nutrient pollutant from 
broiler litter) runs off along with the sediments from crops and pasture lands, adding on to the 
water contamination and eutrophication. These adverse environmental effects are largely 
attributed to the litter application in excess of the nutrient requirement of crops and pastures, 
and/or trying to dispose the byproduct of chicken production (Glover, 1996).     
These externalities prevent a socially optimal use of the water resources among users 
posing negative effects on human health as well as to the ecosystem. The governmental and 
public concern over the potential health effects has forced the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) and state agencies to intensify the regulatory approaches to reduce
                                                            
1
 Broiler litter represents the mixture of broiler excreta, bedding material and waste feed removed from the 
production units during the cleaning process. 
2
 Excessive litter application is defined as an application that provides nutrients (Nitrogen and Phosphorous) greater 
than the crop requirement. 
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nutrient pollution. In fact, the broiler industry is under the threat of environmental regulation 
because of the increased level of nutrient buildup and run off which originates from excessive 
and repetitive litter application (MacDonald, 2008). 
Conceptually, the externality problem can be solved by using price mechanisms, control 
instruments or the pollution standards and restricting the use of pollution-generating inputs in the 
production process. The problem can also be solved by implementing management practices 
which reduces the nutrients amount from reaching the water-bodies. In addition, the concept of 
production termination has been an alternative strategy to reduce agriculture related pollution, in 
recent years (Lambert, et al., 2007; Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988).  
Governmental incentive payments are provided in order to motivate producers to 
voluntarily modify their production practices to meet pollution-reduction goals. Further, the 
section 319 of the Clean Water Act focused on voluntary adoption of best management practices 
(BMPs) to reduce agriculture related non-point source pollution. The implementation of BMPs 
requires farmers’ investment although the farmers fail to experience full benefits out of their 
investments. Such fact affects the BMPs adoptions negatively, resulting in slow rate of BMPs 
adoption among farmers (Gillespie et al. 2008). The first section of this dissertation evaluates the 
underlying factors hindering the voluntary implementation of BMPs. 
The failure to encourage producers from implementing BMPs generates a concern that 
the voluntary effort may fail to meet the desired water pollution reduction goal. The fear of 
failure to mitigate existing agricultural water pollution through voluntary BMP adoptions is also 
fueled by the current environmental conservation programs being economically inefficient 
(Babcock, 1995). In addition, the existing literature argues that the voluntary effort fails to 
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generate desired level of pollution reduction if not combined with other complementary 
governmental regulation (Lyon and Maxwell, 2002).  
Then, the option of terminating (partially/fully) the production program to reduce water 
pollution emerges as a potential alternative to control agricultural water pollution. However, the 
question remains on whether the farmers are willing to terminate the production process to 
comply with water pollution regulation. On the other hand, if the producers are not regulated/not 
charged for the pollution they generate, the non-regulated operations continue contributing 
significantly to the water contamination. Hence, the second section seeks to explore the notion of 
incorporating polluters on pollution reduction processes.  
Thus in this dissertation, three measures of mitigating nutrient pollution originating from 
broiler industries are explored. It covers the concept of bringing the polluters on pollution 
reduction process either through voluntary implementation of BMPs or through providing 
economic incentives and disincentives to the producers. Farmer’s willingness to maintain water 
quality through the manipulation of broiler numbers is evaluated by assessing the level of 
incentive level that the farmer desires to receive, if producer were to cooperate with pollution 
reduction program. In addition, the concept of charging pollution abatement cost to force the 
producers to pay for pollution control measures is also examined in this dissertation. Thus the 
key concept of this dissertation lies on the fact that the implementation of corrective mechanisms 
for nutrient pollution depends on the producers’ response behavior toward mitigating generation 
of the nutrient pollutant.  
I. LOUISIANA BROILER PRODUCTION 
According to Louisiana Agricultural Summary, there were 468 broiler producers in 
Louisiana in 2006 (Louisiana Agricultural summary, 2006). The number of producers has 
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decreased from 579 in 2002, but the production has not decreased (Louisiana Agricultural 
summary, 2003). The numbers suggest the concentration of broiler litter production or the 
concentration of nutrient production has increased in years between 2002 and 2006. The absence 
of a well functioning litter market and cost-efficient transportation system has forced broiler 
producers to dispose excess litter on nearby crops and pasture lands.  
Broiler production in Louisiana is clustered in relatively small, localized areas generating 
a higher concentration of broiler litter in a few counties of northern Louisiana. Essentially, all 
broiler production in Louisiana is vertically integrated and thus operated under contract. In fact, 
production through contractual arrangements provides benefits to the producers such as reduced 
market risk, production reduction responsibilities, lower operating capital requirements, and 
relatively reliable and predictable incomes (Vest and Lacy, 1996). Contract based production 
processes also result in rapid technology adoption, improved production efficiency, as well as 
easy access to capital (Vukina, 2001). However, contract-based production leaves narrow margin 
for profit and full responsibility of litter management to broiler producers.  
The vertical integration of broiler production includes integration from hatcheries through 
feed mills and processing plants. However, broiler production operations require substantial 
investments on litter management which becomes the responsibility of the broiler producers. 
Thus, the producers, not the contractors, face the responsibility of complying with the 
governmental regulations and restrictions regarding environmental issues associated with broiler 
production.  
More specifically, the producers bear the burden of complying to government regulations 
associated with the impact of litter on water quality – increasing their cost of production. 
Furthermore, the producers are awarded or punished based on their production performances. For 
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example, the producers producing more pounds on lower costs and/or having a lower mortality 
rate are paid higher as compared to other growers (Vukina, 2001; Vest and Lacy, 1999), which 
leaves limited or negative economic incentive to broiler producers for litter management.  
Hence, the producers not only have to invest in management practices that lower the 
nutrient production but also are punished by the integrators for increased production costs. 
Therefore, the pressure for the broiler producers comes from both sectors -- the government and 
the contractors, forcing the producers to seek for a low cost litter management option so that they 
can stay in the business.  
II. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s National Water Quality Inventory of year 2000 
reported that more than 41% of Louisiana’s water-bodies either partially or fully fail to support 
the designated use (EPA, 2000)3. In particular, out of 9,455 miles of streams and rivers surveyed, 
only 52% of surveyed miles support the designated water quality goal. More than 11% of rivers 
and streams do not support the designated use and 37% only partially support water quality 
standards (EPA, 2000).  
Similarly, out of 664,124 acres of surveyed lakes in Louisiana, only 57% fully support 
their designated water quality standard. More than 5% of the lakes surveyed fail to support their 
designated use and 15% of the lakes partially support their required characteristics. Moreover, 
only 10% of surveyed wetlands fully meet the criteria for its designated use (EPA, 2000). 
In Louisiana, water-bodies within the western parts of the Ouachita River Basin and the 
eastern parts of the Red River Basin partially meet their designated use or are largely threatened 
                                                            
3
 Environmental Protection Agency. Louisiana waters 
http://www.cleanwaternetwork.org/docs/publications/factsheets/states/la.pdf 
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by the nutrients flow produced by broiler operations and pastureland runoff4. Large scale broiler 
productions concentrated in the northern parishes of Louisiana are responsible for contributing 
the significant amounts of phosphorus and nitrogen in nearby water-bodies5.  
In addition, the lack of a fully functioning litter market has caused an excessive amount 
of litter application on crops and pasture lands. The excessive nutrient application thus 
accelerates both the accumulation and surface flow of nutrients in the watersheds surrounding 
the broiler production region in northern Louisiana. It is well recognized that the improper and 
excessive litter application results in increased nutrient leaching and surface runoff causing water 
contamination (Kingery et al. 1994). However, due to the market driven nature of broiler 
industry and contract based production, the problem of excess litter has been in the shadows 
among the producers.   
EPA noted that the nutrient runoff from land application of livestock manure or poultry 
litter is a major source of pollution that is discharged into the surface waters (EPA, 2000). The 
USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service in consort with the US EPA has recommended a 
voluntary implementation of the BMPs. These practices if implemented decrease the generation 
and transportation of nutrient pollution into the water-bodies6. However, those changes on 
farming operations – to meet nutrient standards – tend to increase production costs through 
investments in nutrient management operations. Thus, changing the farming practices to comply 
with stringent pollution standards is likely to decrease producers’ profits through increased 
production costs (Dupraz et al., 2003). These added production costs and associated profit loss 
have been blamed for a slow rate of BMPs adoptions (Houston and Sun, 2000). Since a reduction 
                                                            
4
 http://nonpoint.deq.louisiana.gov/wqa/poultry.htm 
5
 http://nonpoint.deq.louisiana.gov/wqa/poultry.htm 
6Environmental Issues Facing the Louisiana Poultry Industry: Magazine: Poultry Waste Management accessed from 
http://www.lsuagcenter.com/MCMS/RelatedFiles/{95071472-8B1F-40D9-8162-
404692A70A48}/PoultryEnvironmentalConcerns.pdf  
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in producers’ profits has been recognized as a major factor in hindering the adoption of 
environmentally friendly practices (such as BMP), there is a need to identify alternative 
measures of pollution reductions.  
In addition, after a thorough literature survey of voluntary practices in the United States 
and Europe, Lyon and Maxwell (2002) emphasized that voluntary implementation of 
environmentally friendly production practices are complementary to the environmental 
regulation and/or standard, not the substitute. Therefore, only the voluntary BMPs adoptions may 
not suffice to achieve pollution reduction as desired. The notion of a production termination and 
pollution tax along with voluntary BMPs seems to be a potential combination to reduce nutrient 
build up and runoff.  
Production termination, either partially or fully, is not in the producers’ own interest but 
it is inspired by the threat of environmental regulation. Therefore, the producers require 
sufficient incentives to recover losses associated with the termination of their production process. 
Assigning the level of incentive payment revolves around the notion of farmers’ willingness to 
participate in pollution reduction programs or proposed policies for nutrient pollution reduction. 
Therefore, it is also imperative to understand how much the individuals expect to receive if they 
were to comply with the proposed policies of pollution reduction. Such values in this study are 
measured using contingent valuation approaches. The willingness to accept and willingness to 
pay, are the two different measures to elicit farmers’ desire to participate in a pollution-reduction 
program either through terminating production practices to reduce pollution generation or by 
paying pollution abatement cost. 
I employ willingness to pay and accept measures to evaluate broiler growers’ interest to 
mitigate water pollution problem. This study assumes that the producers are aware of their 
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contribution toward water pollution and the water pollution is negatively associated with human 
health as well as with the ecosystem.  
III. CURRENT PROGRAMS MITIGATING AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION 
The EPA and the states regulated point source pollution through the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program under the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (Clean Water Act)7. The program focused on water pollution mitigation through 
regulatory actions over point sources. A considerable progress was made in restoring and 
maintaining pollution flow. However, the achievement could not solve the nation’s water quality 
problems. Thus, by 1987, the importance of acting over nonpoint source pollution was well 
recognized.  
The amended Clean Water Act, “1987 Water Quality Act” established a national level of 
Nonpoint Source Management Programs to address nonpoint source pollution. The Nonpoint 
Source Management Programs established by section 319 of the amended CWA started to 
provide the EPA the  authorities to offer grants, guidance and technical help for the state 
programs to encourage implementation of nonpoint source management programs. Section 320 
of amended CWA authorizes EPA to provide grants and technical guidance to state and local 
governments for implementing comprehensive management plans to maintain estuaries.  
The Rural Clean Water Program (RCWP) was started in 1980 to address agricultural NPS 
pollution in watersheds until 1990 as an experimental effort. The program focused on 
minimizing pollutant production and improving water quality while producing agricultural 
commodities in the rural areas. The experimental projects included implementation of BMPs to 
                                                            
7
 National Management Measures to Control Nonpoint Source Pollution from Agriculture, EPA 841-B-03-004, July 
2003.  http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/agmm/chap1.pdf  retrieved on Dec 1st 2008 
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mitigate agriculture related nonpoint water pollution and monitoring to examine the effects of the 
BMPs.  
The conservation provisions of the Farm Bill (1996) provides landowners the technical 
and financial assistance to conserve, improve, and sustain the soil, water, air, and related natural 
resources on their land.  Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) was established by 
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (1996 Farm Act) and jointly administered 
by Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and Farm Service Agency (FSA) for the 
purpose of providing incentives to the farmers and ranchers posing threats to soil and water 
resources. The EQIP provides financial incentives, technical guidance and education to comply 
with Federal, State, Tribal, and local environmental regulations as well as to encourage the 
implementation of conservation practices that manage agricultural pollution. 
The EQIP supplies cost-share (generally about 60% but up to 90% for limited resource 
farmers) for an implementation of conservation practices to the grass lands, forest and crops that 
reduces nutrient loading to the nearby water-bodies. Incentive payments are also extended to the 
eligible farmers and ranchers implementing nutrient and manure management from their 
livestock as well as crops and pasture lands. Incentive payments may be extended to three years 
to encourage the implementation of the practices otherwise the farmers will not. The maximum 
of ninety percent cost-share is permitted for the small and limited-resource-farmers. However, it 
may not exceed $450,000 for all EQIP contracts entered during the term of the Farm Bill.  
 The 2008 Farm Bill increased cost incentive payments up to 90% for socially 
disadvantaged farmers or ranchers in addition to limited resource producers as of 2002 Farm 
Bill. Farm Bill 2008 further allowed farmers to receive advance payment up to 30% of the 
amount needed to purchase materials to install and/or implement pollution reduction 
10 
 
mechanisms. The funding for EQIP was $200 million in fiscal year 2002 which increased to $1.1 
billion in year 2007.  The amount for fiscal year 2008 is authorized to be $1.2 billion which will 
again increases gradually to $1.75 billion in 20128. 
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The return from increased level of incentive payments for the implementation of 
voluntary practices has been unconvincing. The unsatisfactory improvement in BMP adoptions 
needs an examination of the factors associated with the rate of adoption over time. The first topic 
of this dissertation explores the duration to implement BMPs as a tool to mitigate nutrient 
generation and runoffs. More specifically, the chapter seeks to answer the question of “what are 
the underlying factors associated with the slow dissemination of BMPs?”  
The next issue incorporated in this dissertation examines the level of government 
incentive to encourage broiler producers to implement environmentally friendly production 
decisions. The dissertation answers what is the minimum amount that the broiler producers are 
willing to accept to forgo their production practices in order to reduce pollution generation.  
Then, the third issues addressed here is the amount that a producer is willing to pay as 
pollution abatement cost.  In this regard, this dissertation seeks to evaluate the maximum amount 
that a broiler producer would like to pay as pollution abatement cost and keep on continuing their 
existing level of production. This serves as the third alternative to mitigate the water pollution 
control issue.  
V. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Due to intensive market oriented broiler production and lack of economic incentive, the 
broiler producers fail to accommodate pollution control efforts on their production function. 
                                                            
8At a glance: Environmental Quality Incentives Program. May 2008 retrieved form 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/farmbill/2008/pdfs/EQIP_At_A_Glance_062608final.pdf on Dec 2nd, 2008  
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Therefore, the primary concentration of this study remains on exploring the mechanisms to 
accommodate polluters on pollution reduction efforts. In addition, the possibility of litter 
transportation will also be examined. The specific objectives are to; 
a) Examine time to adopt BMP. The focus remains on the factors affecting the time to BMP 
adoption. 
b) Evaluate broiler producer’s willingness to accept value to participate on the 
environmentally benign production practices. The value is assumed to represent an 
amount of incentive payment that the farmers desire to receive in order to internalize 
pollution reduction efforts on their production function. 
c) Examine the producer’s willingness to pay value which is assumed to represent an 
amount that an individual can afford (willing to spend) to improve water quality. 
VI. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation examines the four viable alternatives to involve farmers on pollution 
reduction programs. The core content of the research is presented on three “journal article style” 
chapters. The second chapter presents the data collection approach, details on descriptive 
characteristics of respondents, and simple analysis of manure surplus/deficit in broiler producing 
parishes in Louisiana.  
Chapter three, the first essay, evaluates the broiler producers BMP adoption decision using 
a Cox proportional hazard model. The event dependence and heterogeneity among individual 
farmers are accounted for using frailty and conditional frailty models.  
Chapter four estimates the WTA of an individual to reduce pollution generation through 
reduction in broiler production. WTA assumes to represent incentive required by an individual if 
environmental regulation requires them to cut production size to reduce pollution generation. 
12 
 
Similarly, chapter five examines the farmers WTP value in the form of additional tax if they 
were to continue their production practice at current size. Chapter six concludes with policy 
implications of this research.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
I. SURVEY INSTRUMENT  
The data used in this dissertation came from a survey where the population included all 
the broiler producers in Louisiana. The questionnaire design, sampling process and the data 
collection are not a part of this dissertation. Rather I used secondary data collected through 
survey to understand broiler production related issues in Louisiana9. The data covers the broiler 
producers in the major broiler producing parishes of Louisiana including Bienville, Claiborne, 
Jackson, Lincoln, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Sabine, Union, Vernon, Webster, and Winn parishes. 
Figure 2.1 shows the locations of major broiler-producing parishes in Louisiana and table 2.1 
shows the characteristics of respondents. 
   
Figure 2.1 Broiler producing parishes in Louisiana. 
                                                             
9
   Survey design and data collection were done by Paudel (2005).  Ref:  Paudel, K.P.  “Survey of Broiler Farmers in 
Louisiana.”  Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University Agricultural 
Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 2005. 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of respondents 
Age of the respondents (years) *US Census (%) Sample (%) 
15 to 19 years 8.2 0 
20 to 24 years 7.3 8.11 
25 to 34 years 13.5 14.86 
35 to 44 years 15.5 32.43 
45 to 54 years 13.1 13.51 
55 to 59 years 4.7 13.51 
60 to 64 years 3.8 16.22 
65 to 74 years 6.3 1.35 
Educational attainment     
Less than high school graduate 25.20 12.16 
High school graduate (includes equivalency) 32.40 56.76 
Some college, no degree 20.20 14.86 
Bachelor's degree 12.20 9.46 
Graduate or professional degree 6.50 6.76 
Associate degree 3.50 0.00 
Marital status     
Never married 28.60 16.22 
Married 53.80 79.73 
Widowed 7.40 4.05 
Divorced 10.20 0.00 
Asset to liability ratio   
No debt 18.92 
Up to 20% of asset 22.97 
21% to 40% of asset 22.97 
41% to 60% of asset 21.62 
Greater than 60% of asset 13.51 
Ownership of broiler farm   
Individual ownership 71.62 
Family Ownership 20.27 
Others 8.11 
Percentage of household income from broiler industry 
 0 to 20 percent  20.27 
21 to 40 percent  9.46 
41 to 60 percent 20.27 
61 to 80 percent 22.97 
81 to 100 percent 27.03 
On an average an individual broiler grower:  Raises 470,556 broiler birds; Owns 86 percent of 
production land; Applies litter on 46 percent of crop land;                                                                        
 
*Source:   US census bureau at http://factfinder.census.gov                                       
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The data contains the information on three alternative approaches to mitigate nutrient 
pollution generated by broiler producers in Louisiana. The data contains general information for 
BMP adoptions, broiler producers’ willingness to participate in the production termination 
programs, and the amount they need to terminate the production process partially or fully. The 
data also provides information on willingness to pay values as pollution abatement cost. The 
willingness to pay values represent broiler producer’s desired amount to pay for pollution 
abatement in the form of tax. In addition, a separate section adds the information on manure 
application and storage approaches employed by broiler producers. The detailed description of 
data and variables used in this dissertation are presented on the “DATA AND METHOD” 
sections of the associated essays.  
II. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The first section provides the information on farm size and manure application 
approaches employed by the growers. Farm size is represented by numbers of broiler birds raised 
per year (Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2: Farm size measured by number of broiler  
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More than thirty one percent of farmers raise 300-500 thousand broilers per year. Nearly 
seven percent farmers are small broiler growers with less than one hundred thousand broiler 
birds in a year. In general, one house accommodates twenty five thousand broiler birds. Most of 
the houses are built in between 1985 to 1994 (Figure 2.3) when the demand for chicken 
increased rapidly and demand for red meat dropped down (See Figure A1 in Appendix).   
 
Figure 2.3: Broiler houses built by years. 
Thirty seven percent of broiler housings are built in the years from 1985 to 1994. 
Macdonald (2008) also listed more than sixty five percent of the broiler houses nationwide which 
were built in between the years of 1986 and 2000. Only two percent of the houses built in 
between 1954 and 1964 are still in operation (Figure 2.3). Most of those houses are retrofitted to 
fit with the new technology for competitive production. Figure 2.4 shows the number of houses 
retrofitted by years.  
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Figure 2.4: Broiler houses retrofitted to include new technology. 
The second section presents background information on broiler production in Louisiana 
and its impact on water sources. The data contains information on three alternatives measures to 
mitigate water pollution including BMPs adoptions, terminating production process, and paying 
pollution abatement cost in the form of tax.  
The average number of birds produced by Louisiana broiler farmers is 480,000 producing 
approximately 600 tons of broiler litter. Existing litter disposal and management by broiler 
growers often fail to account for nutrient contents of the litter, nutrient required by the plant and 
nutrient content of the soil. On average, Louisiana broiler growers cake out the litter five times in 
one year (Table 2.2). Cake out is a process of removing litter near watering and evaporating 
cooling system normally after each flock of birds are removed for marketing . The remaining 
loose litter is then reused for the new flock until it is ready to be replaced.  
The litter taken out during the cake out process or the cleaning process is piled in the 
storage facilities until the time for land spreading. In general, the data shows more than fifty 
percent of producers keep the litter on pile for only six months (figure 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5: Duration of litter remains in piles. 
Additionally, an individual farmer has been spreading litter on production land for seven 
years on average. Pasture land receives broiler litter up to six times a year (Figure 2.6). The 
result indicates that more than twenty five percent of respondents apply litter on their pasture 
land at least five/six times a year. Whereas, the application on crop land is almost zero. Only 
about 1.3 percent of respondents apply litter on crop land about one to two times a year.  
Therefore, it can be said that the litter is applied on pasture land irrespective of nutrient 
content of soil and nutrient need of pasture land, whereas, only one or two application of 
fertilizer (nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium) are needed based on climatic condition and 
variety of grass grown by the farmers (Barnhart, 1997). These applications of broiler litter, a 
common practice by Louisiana broiler farmers imply an over-application of litter on available 
crop and pasture land. This indicates that the land application of litter is treated as litter disposal 
without any concern over crop nutrient need or the environmental quality. 
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Figure 2.6: Stated reasons for not selling broiler litter. 
The excessive litter application in pasture land mainly results from absence of a well 
functioning litter market and imperfect information about the benefits of broiler litter on crop and 
pasture land.  More than twenty five percent of broiler growers in Louisiana stated the absence of 
a litter market as their main reasons for not selling the byproduct (Figure 2.7). In addition 
eighteen percent of the broiler producers distribute litter to their neighbors and other receivers for 
free, where the underlying reason is absence of a broiler trading market (Figure 2.7).  
It is well recognized that the litter applications replace commercial fertilizer; however, it 
poses a serious concern over the economic gain relative to the conventional commercial 
fertilizer. The cost of litter loading transportation, litter spreading, and the relative cost of 
commercial fertilizers are among the main economic variables affecting substitutability of litter 
to replace commercial fertilizer.  
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Table 2.2: Description of manure management by Louisiana broiler growers 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Litter loading cost ($/ton) 1.77 4.61 0 25 
Litter spreading cost ($/acre) 5.40 12.16 0 60 
No of times an individual cakes out the litter 4.44 2.23 0 8 
Broiler litter, the byproduct of meat production, is generally used on pastures and hay 
lands after the removal from broiler houses in Louisiana. Nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium 
are the major elements that the plants require in relatively larger proportion. On average, one dry 
ton of broiler litter provides 57.5 lbs nitrogen, 51.4 lbs of phosphorus and 39.8 lbs of potassium10 
where the nutrient content of litter found to vary from 34.0 to 89 lbs/ton of nitrogen, 32.0 to 67.2 
lbs/ton of phosphorus and 16.0 to 48.2 lbs/ton of potassium. The nutrient content of litter 
depends on the weather condition, material used for bedding, feed etc. 
Table 2. 3: Manure handling by Louisiana broiler growers. 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
No of times an individual cakes out the litter a 
year 4.44 2.23 0 8 
No of years that individuals have been 
applying litter on crop and pasture land 6.98 10.81 0 37 
Sell litter = 1 0.53 2.67 0 25 
Store litter = 1 0.58 0.62 0 4 
 The nutrient rich broiler litter is generally transported from production sites to the 
application sites. The existing research shows the litter transportation posed a great concern over 
the economic gain as compared to the conventional commercial fertilizer (Kellog, et al., 2000; 
                                                            
10
 Source: Nutrient content of broiler litter. Texas cooperative Extension, the Texas A & M University System. 
http://gallus.tamu.edu/extension%20publications/waste/nutrientcontent.pdf   
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Fleming et al. 1998). The cost of litter loading, transportation, litter spreading, and the relative 
cost of commercial fertilizers are among the main economic variables affecting substitutability of 
litter to replace commercial fertilizer.  
Louisiana broiler producers transfer litter for about 4.5 miles whereas, the cost of litter 
transportation is not cost prohibitive up to one hundred miles from production site (Pellitier, et 
al. 2001). About 53% of respondents stated that they sell the byproduct too but the price they 
receive is very low, which is only about $6.99, whereas Paudel et al. (2002-2003) stated litter 
should command as much as $35.60 per ton based on nutrient content of broiler litter.   
Potential Use of Broiler Litter in Louisiana  
The main agricultural production area in Louisiana occurs in the north-eastern part, where the 
broiler production is also a major agricultural component. Figure 2.7 and 2.8 show the land use 
classification based on crop grown in study area and in Louisiana. The crop-based production 
system is also found in south-western and south-central Louisiana. 
 
Figure 2.7: Land use pattern in study area 
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The main crops grown in Louisiana are sugarcane, soybeans, corn, rice and cotton. Based 
on the nutrient requirement of the major crops grown in Louisiana soybean is the only crop 
where poultry litter may not be the good source of nutrient since it needs no additional nitrogen 
for the production. The nutrient components are not separable in broiler litter and therefore, the 
litter may not be a potential nutrient source for legumes. Other crops can absorb the litter 
production without affecting the environment adversely and within Louisiana, if managed 
properly.  
 
Figure 2.8: Land use classification of Louisiana. 
Table 2.4 details the litter production from the broiler producing parishes in Louisiana. 
Estimated tonnage of litter production and associated nutrient contents are also presented for the 
study region in the table 2.4. The table determines whether the county produces more broiler 
litter than the crop production in the parish can absorb. This determination of a parishes being 
excess/deficit depends on the acreage of crop production, recommended nutrient levels, total 
quantity of litter production, and nutrient content of litter at the time of application.  
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Table 2.4: Crop area, crop-nutrient demand and the nutrient supply from broiler production 
Parishes Production 
broiler/major crops 
Total Production 
(lbs)/acre 
No of 
broiler birds 
Litter produced 
(tons/yr) N (ton) P (ton)  K(ton)  
Litter based classification 
(surplus/deficit) 
Bienville Broilers (Total) 24,174,220 4,395,313 5,494 
     Corn 679 
  
51 20 20 
  Hay 5,000 
  
33 33 33 Excess 
 Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
83 53 53 
  Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 159 140 110   
Claiborne  Broilers (Total) 125,100,900 22,745,618 28,432 
     Corn 223 
  
17 7 7 
  Hay 27,000 
  
176 176 176 Excess 
 Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
192 182 182 
  Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 825 725 569   
Jackson  Broilers (Total) 92,702,725 16,855,041 21,069 
     Hay 10,500 
  
68 68 68 
  Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
68 68 68 Deficit 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 611 537 421   
Lincoln  Major crops are vegetables where broiler litter application is not an appropriate option 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 1,143 1,005 788  Excess 
Natchitoches  Broilers (Total) 97,100,000 17,654,545 22,068 
     Corn 17,010 
  
1,276 510 510 
  Soybean 9,890 
  
0 247 148 
  Sorghum 4,626 
  
278 81 81 Deficit 
 Hay 19,000 
  
124 124 124 
  Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
1,677 962 863 
  Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 640 563 441   
Ouachita Broilers (Total) 23,939,000 4,352,545 5,441 
     Corn 14,949 
  
1,121 448 448 
  Sorghum 4,082 
  
245 71 71 
  Hay 1,800 
  
12 12 12 Deficit 
 Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
1,378 531 532 
  Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 158 139 109   
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Table 2.4 Contd.  
Sabine  Broilers (Total) 165,175,000 30,031,818 37,540 
     Hay 2,200 
  
14 14 14 
  Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
14 14 14 Excess 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 1,089 957 751   
Union  Broilers (Total) 342,269,282 62,230,779 77,788 
     Hay 3,500 
  
23 23 23 
  Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
23 23 23 Excess 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 2,256 1,984 1,556   
Vernon  Major crops are vegetables where broiler litter application is not an appropriate option 
 Broilers (Total) 1,450,000 263,636 330 
   
Excess 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 10 8 7   
Webster  Broilers (Total) 7,200,000 1,309,091 1,636 
     Corn 265 
  
20 8 8 
  Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
20 8 8 Excess 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 47 42 33   
Winn  Broilers (Total) 7,400,000 1,345,455 1,682 
     Hay 2,900 
  
19 19 19 
  Total crop nutrient requirement 
  
19 19 19 Excess 
 Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production 49 43 34   
 Total nutrient supplied by broiler production in major broiler growing parishes of 
Louisiana  5,843 5,138 4,030 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADOPTION OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPs) TO MITIGATE 
NUTRIENT POLLUTION: A DURATION ANALYSIS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Best management practices (BMPs)11 are structures or management practices adopted by 
farmers to reduce the diffused source of pollution in agricultural practices.  Accelerating BMPs 
adoption has been one of the urgent objectives of reducing nutrient pollution associated with 
agricultural production practices. The non-point source management program established by 
section 319 of the Clean Water Act centered its goal on reducing non-point source pollution 
through voluntary adoption and implementation of BMP. Currently, cost-share up to ninety 
percent and fixed payments, are provided to encourage farmers to adopt these environment 
friendly practices. Despite these incentive payments and cost-share mechanism, there has been a 
concern that the diffusion of BMP remains very slow generating a serious concern over 
achieving the desired level of pollution reduction.   
The BMP adoptions require investment to reduce pollution externality where investors 
fail to experience a full benefit of their investments. The need of private investment to produce 
public goods becomes the main hindrance for BMP adoption. Other likely reasons for slow rate 
of BMP adoptions are the uncertainty of outcome, yield and cost, larger amount of initial and 
recurring investments, and less feasible options when planning horizon is limited (Valentin et al., 
2004; Gillespie et al., 2007). 
These characteristic of BMP force the broiler producers to delay or avoid investment on 
BMP adoption. Potential adopters thus tend to wait until the utility from incentive payment for 
                                                            
11
 The Best Management practices under this study are; Filter strips; Field borders; Grassed waterways; Wildlife 
corridors; Critical area planting; and Compost facility. 
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adoption equals the disutility associated with the cost of adoption, or until the time when benefits 
from adoption outweigh the cost (punishment caused by stringent regulation) associated with 
pollution generation.  
The duration of time that a farmer decides to wait, until he/she adopts a practice, depends 
on individual as well as other farm level characteristics. Although, farmers are generally exposed 
to these practices over time, they decide to adopt the practice only after a certain time.  Some 
individual tend to be more interested on adopting than others and some farm characteristic favor 
some BMP adoption better than others. Thus, the individual and farm specific characteristics 
contribute differently on BMP adoption decision resulting into individual specific heterogeneity 
among BMP adoptions.  
Furthermore, some individual or the farm level characteristics favor multiple BMP 
adoptions while others hinder the adoption of second/third practices. The occurrence of multiple 
adoptions by the same individual generates correlation among the practices by a particular 
individual. The dependence among adoptions originates from the fact that the events of BMP 
adoptions share some characteristics that are unobserved or unmeasured at the time of survey. 
For example, adoption of one BMP practice may make another adoption more/less likely. 
Studies have acknowledged the occurrence of multiple BMP adoptions (Gillespie et al., 
2007; Cooper, 2003; Dorfman, 1996). Gillespie et al. (2007) examines adoption decision of 
sixteen best management practices while Cooper (2003) and Dorfman (1996) examine five and 
two BMPs. These studies failed to accommodate the interdependence on adoption decision of 
different management practices caused by individual specific heterogeneity or event (adoption) 
dependence in their analysis.  
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 Thus, the most appealing issues that have been remained unaddressed in the BMP 
literature are dealing with correlation among adoptions caused by individual specific 
heterogeneity as well as event dependence.  Studies failing to accommodate such correlation 
provide bias and inefficiency in the parameter estimates. Therefore, the validity of the research 
done without allowing the correlation among adoption decisions remains questionable.   
Therefore, the main objective of this section is to develop farm level model of BMP 
adoption allowing the individual specific heterogeneity as well as the event dependence among 
multiple BMP adoptions. I employ the duration model to understand what variables influence 
farmers to wait and eventually decide to adopt the BMPs. The focus remains on the covariates 
affecting the time to adopt BMP. While evaluating the important factors affecting the time to 
adopt, this study accommodates the individual specific heterogeneity as well as event 
dependence assumed to exist in the data set.  
I employ the Cox proportional hazard model to evaluate the factors affecting the 
diffusion of BMP. The analysis provides better estimates of the factors affecting the slow rate of 
BMP adoption after correcting for the event dependence and heterogeneity.  More specifically 
a) I employ variance corrected models which simply corrects the covariance matrix 
leading to more reliable hypothesis testing.  
b) I employ shared frailty model to allow for the individual specific characteristic 
(random effects).  
c) Finally, I employ conditional frailty model to allow for the individual heterogeneity 
as well as event dependence that occurs on multiple adoptions.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
BMP Adoptions  
Most of the empirical work on the field of technology adoption and technology diffusion 
are focused on the field of technologies that enhance the profitability of a firm (Abdulai and 
Huffman, 2005). Adoption of new technologies designed to reduce the adverse effect of 
agricultural practices on natural resources has also been a focus of recent studies. 
 A few examples include evaluating factors affecting BMP adoption decision (Kim et al. 
2005); effect of BMP adoption on farm profitability (Valentin et al. 2004); incentive level to 
enhance adoption of conservation practices (Cooper and Keim, 1996; Devuyst and Ipe, 1999). 
Some attempts have been made to examine the reasons for the slow rate of BMP adoption 
(Gillespie et al. 2007) from the perspective of evaluating the factors hindering the adoption 
decision of a producer.  
These studies conclude the farmers are less likely to implement in conservation practices 
due to uncertain results, larger amount of investments, and less feasible options when a planning 
horizon is limited (Valentin, et al., 2004). The age of farmers, scale of production and 
productivity levels of farmers are also considered to be main contributing factors of farmers’ 
decisions to adopt and implement the best management practices (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 
2004). In addition, uncertainty about soil conditions, production levels, associated profits and 
risk taking behaviors of producers are also responsible for the slow adoption rates of newer 
technologies of farming practices (Isik and Khanna, 2003). 
Most of the studies in the area of technology adoption associated with farming practices 
often tend to use binomial or multinomial logit and probit models (Dorfman, 1996: Neill and 
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Lee, 2001; Cooper, 2003; Kim et al. 2005). These studies base their analysis on the individual’s 
adoption behavior at a particular point in time.  
In general, BMP adoption should reveal a slow increasing trend in the initial stages – 
eventually increasing, once the farmers become more familiar with the new practices. 
Technology diffusion theory suggest that the adoption rate improves at an increasing rate once 
the individuals become better informed about the potential benefits – eventually slowing down 
after a certain point, thus producing an S-shaped adoption curve.  
The existing studies neglect the dynamic aspects of BMP adoption and fail to 
accommodate the effects of regressors on the time path of an adoption which is an important 
element while studying the slow process of BMP adoption. Even though the models explain why 
some producers adopt/do not adopt at a given time, the models lack the examination of reasons 
why some individuals adopt sooner or later than others.   
Duration Analysis, Heterogeneity and Event Dependence 
The duration or the failure time model examines the patterns of BMP adoption and 
diffusion along with evaluating the effects of individual’s characteristics on the timing of BMP 
adoption. Duration analysis is originally employed in biomedical research (Hougard, 1995, 
Duchateau et al, 2002). Recent use of this approach accommodates the studies in technology 
adoption (Karshena and Stoneman, 1993; Bapista 2000), labor economics (Han and Hausman, 
1990: Addison and Pedro 2004; An et al. 2004), marketing research (Gonul and Srinivasan, 
1993) and agricultural economics (Burton, et al. 2003, Fuglie ad Kascak, 2003).   
The duration model, in the context of farming technology adoption, evaluates the impact 
of covariates on the time to adoption since the technology became available to farmers (Dadi, 
2004). Dadi (2004) estimates adoption behavior of Ethiopian farmers using the duration model. 
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The estimates suggest timing of adoption is influenced by the incentive payment received by 
farmers. The probability that a farm exits from the state of non-adoption to adoption (represented 
by a hazard rate) is influenced by the economic incentive observed by farmers (Dadi, 2004). In 
fact, the rate measures the proportion of adopters during a particular time  compared to those 
who have not adopted until time   1. 
Similarly, the duration model used to evaluate the diffusion of conservational practices 
supports a very slow rate of adoption (Fuglie and Kascak, 2003). Diffusion patterns suggest 
some factors have comparatively stronger effect at the early stages of adoption process (Baptista, 
2000) as compared to later stage. The pattern of adoption over time is explained by the farm as 
well as individual producer’s characteristics (Baptista, 2000).  
Further, the timing of adoption is correlated within a geographical area supporting the 
notion that the surrounding farming operations also affect the process of technology adoption 
(Abdulai and Hufman, 2005).  Also, the individuals bear different individual or firm specific 
characteristics that may generate a higher or lower adoption rate for some cases than others. For 
example, a producer having varied level of soil characteristics or building structures may 
influence the likelihood that they will adopt the BMP.  
Some producers bearing similar characteristics tend to behave similarly on adoption 
decision than others. Such behavior introduces heterogeneity across individuals and correlation 
within groups having similar characteristics. Sometimes, an individual may adopt more than one 
BMP simultaneously. In such case, the adoptions are correlated within subject and are 
heterogeneous among subjects.  
Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989) illustrate an example that includes recurrence of tumors 
on cancer patients. Their model assumes the patients are at risk of developing multiple tumors 
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from the beginning. The same concept is borrowed in the context of BMP adoption where the 
broiler producers are likely to adopt from the onset of BMP.  The core concept is that the 
adoption of one BMP may affect the happening of another adoption either positively or 
negatively given the fact that these adoptions come from the same individual. Thus, the event 
occurrences share some unobserved characteristics of the individuals. 
Current studies employing the hazard model allows those correlations within a group and 
heterogeneity among individuals through corrected variances (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 
2002; Jensen and Ahlburg, 2004). These models correct the variance covariance matrix to 
provide valid hypothesis testing. There are other sets of studies which believe that the 
heterogeneity and event dependence generate biased parameter and therefore need suitable 
models to work for the issues. Shared frailty models have been suggested for allowing individual 
heterogeneity (Hougaard, 1995; Duchateau et al., 2002) and conditional frailty model for 
allowing repeated event process (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2007).   
Recently, the conditional frailty approach has been used in order to accommodate 
individual heterogeneity as well as the multiple event dependence. The model is suggested to 
provide asymptotically unbiased and efficient estimates in presence of heterogeneity as well as 
event dependence (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006). As per my knowledge the model is 
employed in Medical (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006) and political research (Box-
Steffensmeier et al. 2007) and this study will be the first application in the field of economics.  
III. MODEL 
Basic Model 
The duration model has been used in agricultural technology adoption and diffusion 
literature by several authors (Dadi, 2004; Fuglie and Kascak 2003; Baptista, 2000; Abdulai and 
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Huffman 2005). It evaluates the impact of covariates on the time to adopt the BMP from the time 
that it became available to farmers. Consider a set of farmers  	 1,2, … … ,  are examined 
from a time when the first BMP became available (time zero ), to a failure time  , when a 
farmer adopts a BMP; or to a censoring time (survey time,  . The observed time for an 
individual is a random variable denoted by  	 min ,  with an indicator . The  takes 
a value of one, if failure time  is observed (adoption occurred before the survey) and zero 
otherwise (censored). The main interest of time-to-adoption data are (a) The survivor function, 
defined as the probability that the adoption has not occurred at time , that is adoption has not 
occurred until time   1. 
 	    	 1   
(b) The hazard functions of , which is defined as the probability that the spell is 
completed at time  given that it is not completed by anytime before . 
 	 lim  ! "  #  $ %|  %  
(c) The cumulative density function of  which is expressed as;  
 	 ' (%(  
The duration models and the analysis of duration, in general, are formulated in terms of 
hazard of failure or the distribution of duration of a spell denoted by t*.  
 It is assumed that the variation in the distribution of the duration is characterized by a 
vector of + explanatory variables , - 	  ./,  .0, … … … ,  .12. In case of the proportional hazard 
model, the hazard is expressed as a product of baseline hazard and some function that explains 
how the risk of adoption is associated with the different values of covariates. The hazard function 
of an  3 individual at time  is thus expressed as; 
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| - 	 4 -  
where,   is the baseline hazard function which provides the shape to the hazard function. 
The  is assumed to be an unspecified baseline hazard corresponding to an individual whose 
covariates takes values of zero. In absence of any effect of covariates on the hazard function, the 
baseline hazard shows the value of risk common to all individuals. The baseline hazard explains 
the duration dependence such as whether the hazard rate of an individual adopting a BMP 
depends on the time that an individual has already spent in the spell. 
The 4 -  represents a non-negative functions of -. The widely used functional form 
for the hazard model as proposed by Cox (1972) is 4- 	 exp- 5. The model that uses 
exponential functional form of explanatory variable along with the baseline hazard is widely 
known as the Cox proportional hazard model. Under the Cox proportional hazard model, the 
hazard function is expressed as; 
    |- 	 exp6-78                   (3.1) 
The vector 7 represents unknown regression parameters explaining the dependence of hazard on 
the explanatory variables. The corresponding survival function can be expressed as; 
|- 	 exp6-78 
where,   	 9.+ : ; (%( <  represents the survival function of an individual whose all 
covariates are equal to zeros. Assuming no ties among the event times, the parameters can be 
estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood function as suggested by Cox (1972)  
                                                    =7 	 ∏ ? exp-@7∑ BCexpD-E7FGEHI JK@LM/                 (3.2) 
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NO is observed duration. Computationally, maximizing the log of the likelihood function is more 
convenient to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. Further, the variance is obtained by 
using second derivative of the likelihood function evaluated at estimated coefficient. 
PQ!D7RF 	  S%0TUV=7%70 WX/YR  
Correlated Time-to-event Data 
Correlated event times may occur due to recurrent event processes such as multiple BMP 
adoptions by an individual. In case of repeated occurrences, correlation among the event times 
can arise from the following two sources; 
a) Individual Heterogeneity 
 Individual broiler producers bear different individual or firm specific characteristics, 
some of which may be unknown, unmeasured or un-measureable to the researchers.  Those 
unobserved characteristics generate higher or lower rate of adoptions for some BMPs than 
others. For example, producers have diverse level of soil characteristics and building structures 
which may influences the likelihood that they will adopt the BMP but either can’t be measured 
or are unknown to the researcher at the time of data collection. As a result, some producers tend 
to adopt faster than others introducing heterogeneity across individuals. Furthermore, a producer 
who adopts one BMP may be more inclined or resistant to another BMP adoption. This fact 
generates correlation among recurrent BMP adoptions or the timing of those BMPs adoptions.   
b) Event Dependence 
In some time-to-event models, an occurrence of one BMP adoption may make successive 
events more or less probable. For example, adoption of one BMP may provide producers 
incentive/disincentive to adopt another set based on how they perceive the benefit/cost of 
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adopting previous BMP. In any case, the likelihood of adoption is a function of previous 
occurrence inducing within individual level correlation among the observations.  
Thus, the correlation among events can either be produced by individual heterogeneity or 
by event dependence or by both. In the presence of individual level heterogeneity or recurrence 
of events, it is realistic to assume lack of independence among individual events (Collet, 2003). 
The correlation among event times violates the assumption of independence assumed by the Cox 
proportional hazard model. Failing to account for the correlation among events and analyzing 
correlated events produce biased and inefficient estimates (Kelly and Lim, 2000). Doing so 
overstates the level of information that each observation provides, leading to incorrect standard 
errors. In addition, the analysis restricts the impacts of covariates to be the same across the 
multiple events, while there may be different effects from one event to another.  
The variance corrected models estimate the standard Cox proportional model and adjusts 
the covariance matrix in order to allow for the correlation due to repeated events and/or 
individual heterogeneity. The Cox model provides consistent estimates to the population 
parameters even in the presence of correlation. However, the covariance matrix is inappropriate 
for hypothesis testing (Lin and Wei 1989). One of the most widely used variance corrected 
models is a model developed by Wei et al. (1989). The model allows multiple events to have 
different baseline hazards so that the hazard function can differ from the first BMP adoption to 
the second BMP adoption and so on.  
Each individual farmer is considered to be at risk for all the consequent events from the 
beginning. More specifically, individual farmers are at risk set of adopting all available BMPs at 
all the time prior to the occurrence of that particular event. The observations are then stratified 
based on the number of adoptions occurred. A separate baseline hazard is constructed for the first 
38 
 
adoption then the second and so on.  However, the effects of covariates are assumed to be 
constant over the different events. 
The Cox proportional hazard model changes into the following expression while allowing 
for stratification based on event occurrence. The individual farmers are stratified into Z (Z 	
1, 2, . .6 available set of BMPs) categories based on the number of BMPs adopted.  
                                      =7 	 ∏ ∏ ? ]^_-@` 7∑ ∑ BE`a`HI ]^_-@` 7GEHI JK@`bcM/LM/  (3.3) 
 The variance corrected model takes account of the inefficiency contributed by the 
heterogeneity through correcting the standard errors. However, the approach fails to incorporate 
the heterogeneity effect on the estimates and therefore the estimates remain inconsistent (Kelley 
and Lim 2000).  
The frailty model incorporates the heterogeneity into the model estimators by treating the 
frailty term as random draws from a known parametric distribution. Experiencing an event is 
assumed to be independent of the chosen distribution. The frailties are unobserved random effect 
across individuals and are assumed to be constant over time for a particular individual. The 
model also treats the correlation due to repeated events as a special case of more general 
heterogeneity induced by the individual specific characteristics (Box- Steffensmeier , 2007; 
Vaupel, 1979).  
With the inclusion of random effects in the proportional hazard model, the hazard rate 
equation changes as follows; 
                              c|-c 	 exp6.c7 $ d8                     (3.4) 
where,  d is the vector of random effects or frailty for  3 individual and Z is the number of 
possible events for each individual.  
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The frailty models have been criticized because of lacking sufficient theoretical support 
on choosing a particular parametric distribution. Additionally, the estimates are generally 
sensitive to the selected error distribution (Kosorok et al. 2004). The random effects model can 
be presented in the following form so as to make easier illustration of functional form of the 
random effects; 
|-c 	 exp6.c78 expd 	 (exp6.c78 
The random effects are assumed to have gamma distribution for which the probability density 
function is expressed as; hi( 	 jIklIexpmnkopIkΓ:Ik<  .The interest here is on the variance of the random 
effects , PQ!d, which is used to explain heterogeneity. For gamma distribution variance is 
assumed to be PQ!( 	 q.  
Now, the likelihood function for the model, conditional on the random effects becomes; 
                           =7 	 ∏ ? exp-@`7rs@∑ BCtexpD-E`7rs@FGEHI JK@LM/                  (3.5) 
In fact, both the variance-corrected proportional hazard model as well as random effects 
model has been used in order to account for the correlated events (Jensen and Ahlburg, 2004; 
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). Table 3.1 shows the ability of different models to handle the 
heterogeneity and event dependence. 
To allow within subject correlation through event dependence as well as the individual 
heterogeneity, there is a need to develop a new model. In this model, event dependence is 
controlled through “event based stratification” and the unobserved heterogeneity through 
inclusion of a random factor in the model (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007). This new model is 
called the conditional frailty model which originates using gap time where the parameters are 
interpreted in terms being at the risk of kth event after the occurrence of previous one. 
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The hazard of observing kth event for ith individual is then expressed as (Box-
Steffensmeier et al. 2007); 
                    c|- 	 c  cX/exp6-c7 $ d8            (3.6) 
where, k represents the number of events (BMP adoptions) that an individual producers 
experience. c  is the baseline hazard rate that varies with the number of events that an 
individual experiences.   cX/ represents a gap time from Z  1th event occurrence to Zth 
event occurrence. The d represents an unknown vector of random effects contributed by 
individuals and each individual contain a random effect that is shared within recurrent events. 
Then the partial likelihood of the event occurrence becomes; 
          =7 	 ∏ ∏ ? exp-@`7rs@∑ ∑ B@`exp-@`7rs@KtHIGEHI JbcM/LM/ K@`                      (3.7) 
Table 3.1: Alternative models, their abilities to handle heterogeneity and event correlation, 
their pitfalls and advantage 
 
 
Models 
Does it handle 
 
 
Pitfall of 
the model 
 
 
Advantage of the 
model 
 
Heterogeneity 
Event 
correlation 
Cox-proportional 
Hazard model 
No No Assumption 
not met 
Easy to estimate 
Variance Corrected 
model 1 
No Yes Inconsistent  Comparatively 
Efficient Estimates 
Variance Corrected 
model 2 
No Yes Inconsistent Comparatively  
Efficient Estimates 
Frailty Model Yes No Large 
standard 
errors.  
Reduced bias 
Conditional Frailty 
Model 
Yes Yes Large 
standard 
errors 
Asymptotically 
consistent and 
efficient  estimates 
Note: Variance corrected model 1 corrects variance using cluster corrected robust standard errors.  Variance 
corrected model 2 is developed by Wei et al. (1989) which creates a separate baseline hazard for each event 
occurrence. 
41 
 
IV. DATA 
The state of interest in this chapter is non-adoption which is defined as the state at which 
an individual is at the risk of adoption. And the event of interest is the exit from non-adoption to 
the adoption of the practice. The duration of adoption starts from the first recorded adoption of a 
practice (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) and ends when an individual either adopts a practice 
from a set of BMPs or is censored. The spells that were not completed before the survey 
(summer 2004) were considered to be censored. The non adopters are censored at the calendar 
year of 2004 when the survey was conducted.  
The time starting from the year 1954 to the time of adoption or time of censor is 
considered to be the dependent variables for the models except for the conditional frailty model 
(Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; Fuglie and Kascak, 2003). The time that a farmer waits before 
adopting a BMP is measured by the number of years elapsed since the introduction of BMP 
(assuming first BMP was introduced in 1954).  
The conditional frailty model requires data organized in a different format than the other 
models require. The setting of the data for the conditional frailty model is listed in the Appendix 
B. The repeated adoptions of BMP are assumed to be recurrence of events. Under the case of 
BMP adoption, a recurrence of event is defined as “the event occurrence where an individual 
adopts BMP/s more than once in his farming period or under the study period”.  
The data used in this section comprise 88 broiler producers with 57 events of interest 
(adoptions). Farmers are assumed to be exposed to six available BMPs once they became 
available or the producer entered the firm. The producers who entered the business later than 
1954 entered the risk set as soon as they entered the business (Dadi et al., 2004). For late entrants 
the duration variable counted from the year they started in the broiler industry to the year they 
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adopted the BMP/censored at the time of survey. This is because the BMP practices were already 
available when the individual entered the business and they started to be at risk as soon as they 
entered the business.  
 
Figure 3.1: Total number of BMP adoptions over the years 
There were six best management practices available or suggested to the producers.  The 
best management practices available or suggested to the producers are included in the survey and 
are listed as follows; 
Filter strips: Filter strips are designed for removing or blocking the sediments and other 
nutrient pollutants from runoff. The strips are the area of vegetation adjacent to the stream if 
there is one near or on the farm. The vegetative strips also increase the nutrient intake reducing 
the leaching of excessive nutrients from the field to the water sources. The cost of adopting this 
practice is 210 dollars per acre (2003) 
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Field borders: Field boarders are the strips of perennial vegetation planted on the edge 
of the fields. The borders are designed to control sediment runoff which carries excessive 
phosphorus from the field to the water-bodies. Adoption cost per ft is about 0.10 dollars (2003).  
Grassed waterways: The grassed waterways are natural or constructed vegetative 
channel designed to stabilize the surface runoff. The grassed waterways help to prevent the 
nutrient flow through sediment erosion. The estimated cost of adoption is 2400 dollars per acre.  
Wildlife Corridors: These are designed to creating restoring and enhancing wildlife 
habitat. The estimated cost of adoption is 25 dollars per acre. 
Critical area planting: Critical area planting represents the plantations that are designed 
for reducing erosion from highly erodible fields and the fields with greater slope (find better 
words).   
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Broiler Producers Adopting Best Management Practices 
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Compost facilities: The facilities convert organic matter, such as dry poultry litter, dead 
chickens or other poultry wastes into more uniform and less odored substance. The estimated 
cost of building 6-bin composting facility is 18,000.   Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of broiler 
producers implementing different BMPs. 
Explanatory Variables  
a) Farm Characteristics 
 Number of broilers represents the total number of broiler birds raised by an individual 
producer in 2003. The numbers are divided by 1000 for easier computational purpose. The larger 
the number of birds implies a larger production level. The production size is found to be 
positively related to the technology adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) including BMP 
adoption (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 2004).  
Farm income is defined as the income associated with broiler production. Producers with 
higher farm income are more likely to adopt BMP (Gillespie et al., 2007). In this study, farm 
income is defined as a dummy variable to indicate whether a farm is earning a positive or a 
negative profit. Positive profit provides a financial flexibility to the producers to be willing to 
adopt BMP.  
b) Information Dissemination 
 The producers who have better information regarding BMP either through education or 
exposition to the extension services are more likely to adopt BMP (Koundouri et al., 2006). 
Level of education and contact with extension agents are employed to capture the effect of 
information accessibility on BMP adoption. Education is a dummy variable indicating whether 
an individual holds at least a college degree.  
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Contact with extension agents was constructed using the information obtained indicating 
whether an individual has visited the extension agents in the last year. The variable is then used 
as a proxy for his/her general contact with the extension service providers. The variable 
represents whether an individual has visited extension agents or have been visited by the agents 
in the previous year. Individual producers who are exposed to the extension service are aware 
about BMPs. Both the education (Gillespie et al., 2007) and contact with extension agents are 
assumed to be positively affecting the BMP adoption (Koundouri et al., 2006).  
c) Demographic Variables 
 Farmer’s own characteristics play a major role in the choice of technology adoption. The 
variable, Age, provides mixed result. Age is positively associated with the likelihood of BMP 
adoption (Gillespie et al., 2007), while it is negatively related with irrigation technology 
adoption (Koundouri et al., 2006). Younger farmers are found to be more knowledgeable and 
more risk taking due to longer planning horizons, and therefore, are more likely to adopt BMP 
(Adesina and Zinnah, 1993).  
Years of being in farming is considered to be an important factor on adoption decision 
(Gillespie et al., 2007). Studies consider number of years in the business as experience of an 
individual producer. However, in absence of successor we assume the coefficient associated with 
this variable may have a negative sign. This is because the longer the time in the business, it is 
more likely that the producers retire from the business. The existing literatures, however, show a 
positive relationship of experience with the likelihood of adoption (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993). 
Therefore, the coefficient associated with this variable may show either a positive or negative 
sign. 
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Business ownership is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is individually or 
family owned. Individually owned businesses are more likely to adopt erosion and sediment 
control BMPs. Having family members to take over the business, once the producer is retired, 
extends the planning horizon. Thus having descendants to continue the business is hypothesized 
to be positively related to the BMP adoption (Gillespie et al., 2007).  
d) Policy Variable: 
 Policy variable is created as a dummy representing whether the adoption was before the 
initiation of the cost-share program in 1996. Economic incentives associated with the adoption 
increases the likelihood of technology adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993).  
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of variables used 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Number of broilers/1000 528 455.38 288.56 18 1900 
Age of farmer at the time of survey 522 52.95 12.58 23 79 
At least collage education =1 528 0.80 0.272 0 1 
Individual ownership=0 otherwise=1 492 1.012 0.109 0 1 
Number of years in the business 528 19.53 12.51 0 57 
Income from broiler production positive income=1 510 0.894 0.307 0 1 
Descendants to continue farming after retire 456 0.171 0.367 0 1 
Adoption after 1996=1 otherwise=0 500 0.954 0.209 0 1 
Contact with extension agent =1 otherwise=0 522 .586 .493 0 1 
Calendar year of adoption 500 1954 2004 
Duration from base year to adoption year or censor 500 19.35 12.19 0 50 
Note: There were 88 observation points obtained from the survey. With the individuals being at risk of adopting 
six different practices within a set of BMP, the total number of observation becomes 528. 
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V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The duration models presented above are estimated to examine the time taken by broiler 
producers to adopt BMP given its availability. The time to adoption is considered to be a 
function of individual producer specific as well as farm specific characteristics. The model 
estimates the probability of a producer adopting a BMP at a particular time  given that the 
producer hasn’t adopted until time   1. 
Table 3.3: Variance corrected models for BMP adoption (Cox regression model) 
Variables Coefficients 
 
Hazard ratio 
Broiler numbers 
 
0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
1.002 
 
Experience 
 
-0.020 
(0.025) 
0.980 
 
Education 
 
0.464 
(0.631) 
1.591 
 
Age 
 
0.002* 
(.0008) 
1.001 
 
Farm income 
 
0.114 
(0.375) 
1.011 
 
Contd. after retirement 
 
0.557 
(0.589) 
1.745 
 
Ownership 
 
-1.049 
(0.818) 
.0350 
 
Policy  
 
-3.500*** 
(0.414) 
0.301 
 
Contact with extension agent 
 
1.297*** 
(0.497) 
 3.659 
 
Wald test  113.99*** 
Log likelihood -147.952  
Note:     * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
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Results from two variance corrected models are presented on table 3.3 and 3.4. The 
results for two frailty models are presented on table 3.5 and 3.6. The tables present coefficient 
estimates and their standard errors with hazard ratios. The first table (Table 3.3) presents the 
result for the Cox proportion hazard model with cluster corrected robust standard errors. The 
cluster corrected variance matrix is robust to any kind of intra cluster correlation and arbitrary 
heterogeneity, given that the number of observations is relatively larger than the number of 
groups (Wooldridge, 2002: page: 300). The second column presents the hazard ratio. 
Table 3.4 contains results for the marginal model of Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989). The 
Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (WLW) model allows separate baseline hazards for each event 
occurrence. In addition, it allows all the individuals to be “at risk” of adopting any of the 
available BMPs from the beginning of the observation period. Individual heterogeneity is taken 
into account by using cluster corrected variance and the observations are stratified to allow for 
different baseline hazards for each BMP adopted. 
In presence of individual level heterogeneity, variance correction models may not suffice 
to provide reliable parameter estimates since the model only corrects the variance-covariance 
matrix and provides better hypothesis testing. Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2007) suggested using a 
random effect model in order to estimate consistent parameters. Their study claims a significant 
improvement on model performance while using the frailty model. I therefore estimate frailty 
models which are presented on table 3.5 and table 3.6. The frailty models account for the 
individual level heterogeneity assumed to exist among individual producers and event 
dependence within an individual’s recurrent adoptions.  
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Table 3.4: Variance correction models for BMP adoption (WLW model) 
Variables Coefficients Hazard ratio 
Broiler numbers 
 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
1.002 
 
Experience 
 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
0.968 
 
Education 
 
0.093 
(0.391) 
1.593 
 
Age 
 
.0021** 
(.001) 
1.002 
 
Farm income 
 
0.093 
(0.391) 
1.097 
 
Contd. after retirement 
 
0.340 
(0.637) 
1.406 
 
Ownership 
 
-0.852 
(0.789) 
0.426 
 
Policy  
 
-1.755*** 
(0.574) 
0.173 
 
Contact with extension agent 
 
1.403* 
(0.501) 4.066 
Wald test  61.05***  
Log likelihood -96.026  
Note:     * , **  and *** stands for the variable is significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance 
respectively. 
The first column in table 3.5 contains estimates for the shared frailty model and the 
second column provides the hazard ratio associated with the models. The model incorporates 
variations across individuals, which are unaccounted for  the inclusion of observed variables. 
These unobserved variations affect an individual’s susceptibility to adopt BMP. The 
heterogeneity originates from the fact that some individuals are more susceptible to hazard of 
adoption than others; however, the measured variables fail to account for those characteristics 
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causing the variations on adoption. Some producers are frailer to the adoption due to such 
unmeasured/unknown factors. The random effect parameter included in the model absorbs the 
unknown factor causing heterogeneity in the BMP adoption. Thus the presence of unmeasured 
variation can be determined by the inclusion of the random effects in the model. Since there are 
multiple adoptions by one individual there, effects of unobserved characteristics are shared by 
different adoptions. 
A Likelihood ratio test is carried out to examine the presence of heterogeneity. The test 
statistics measures whether the variance of the random effect (let’s denote it by v) term is greater 
than zero. The result from likelihood test for v shows variance of the random effect is greater 
than zero at 0.05 percent level of significance. The result indicates the presence of the random 
effect. This result suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is affecting the models where the 
random effect might have originated from the individual heterogeneity or by event dependence. 
Furthermore, event dependence is suspected as the data comes from the same individual 
who may become more susceptible or resistant to adoption after adopting one BMP. In addition, 
no theory or the analysis guides about the source of greater variance estimate of the random 
effect parameter. The random effect can either be from individual heterogeneity or from event 
dependence.  
A conditional frailty model is employed to allow for the event dependence. The model 
estimates different baseline hazards for each successive event. In addition, the model accounts 
for the heterogeneity by allowing the estimation of random effect parameter into the model. The 
conditional frailty model reduces bias in estimated parameters and/or reduces the size of variance 
of random effect (v), as compared to variance corrected and shared frailty models (Box-
Steffensmeier et al., 2007). 
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Table 3.5: Individual heterogeneity model for BMP adoption (Shared frailty model) 
Variables 
Coefficients 
 (Robust Std. Err) Hazard. Ratio 
Broiler numbers 
 
0.002* 
(.001) 
1.002 
 
Experience 
 
-0.090*** 
(0.036) 
0.914 
 
Education 
 
0.383 
(0.872) 
1.466 
 
Age 
 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
1.002 
 
Farm income 
 
0.304 
(0.351) 
1.356 
 
Contd. after retirement 
 
0.486 
(0.699) 
1.625 
 
Ownership 
 
-2.685 
(2.192) 
0.068 
 
Policy  
 
-4.669*** 
(0.627) 
.009 
 
Contact with extension agent 
 
1.287** 
(0.605) 
3.625 
 
Theta 1.141 
Wald test  60.64*** 
Log likelihood -146.576  
Shared frailty model: LR test of theta=0: w/0 = 2.75 Prob>=w/0chibar2 = 0.049 
Note:     * , **  and *** stands for the variable is significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance 
respectively. 
Table 3.6 presents the result obtained from the conditional frailty model as suggested by 
(Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006). The conditional frailty model is estimated using the R 
software, as STATA and SAS lack the built-in function to perform a conditional frailty analysis. 
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Once the observations are stratified based on events, using the conditional frailty model, the 
estimated variance of the random effect reduces to zero. Such result indicates the heterogeneity 
in the model is contributed by event dependence. The large variance of random factors appeared 
in the shared frailty model disappeared with conditional frailty model. The result thus supports 
the fact that the main source of within subject correlation was contributed by event dependence.  
Hence, the result from conditional frailty model is used to interpret the results. Once 
heterogeneity as well as the event dependence is accounted for, the estimated beta coefficients 
are interpreted as “estimated change in logarithm of hazard ratio due to one unit change in a 
covariate” (Collett 2003; page 90). So, the hazard ratio of exiting from the state of non-adoption 
is ! *expx5yz when . changes by ! units. The hazard ratios are used to test the hypothesis of no 
impact of the covariates on hazard of adoption. The hazard ratio, greater (smaller) than one, is 
equivalent to the positive (negative) sign of the coefficients.  
The size of farming is probably the most prominent variable on technology adoption 
literatures (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Dadi et al. 2004; Dorfman, 1996, Adesina and Zinnah, 
1993). The variable is positively related to the adoption decision (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993; 
Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). In this study, number of birds represents the size of farming. The 
farm size shows a positive effect on hazard of adoption. One unit in broiler number in the 
analysis represent 1000 birds so, one unit increase in broiler number increases the conditional 
probability of adoption by 0.1 %. The result indicates that duration of adoption decreases with 
increase in the size of production. Thus the result implies that the larger firms are early adopters.  
The experience in the business represents the years that an individual spent on broiler 
production. The variable is negative and significant at a ten percent level of significance. One 
year increase in year that an individual spent on farming decreases the hazard of adoption by four 
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percent (1-.959=0.041). The significant negative impact of years spent on farming implies that an 
individual who is involved in farming for many years tends to wait longer to adopt a best 
management practice to reduce water pollution. The result implies that these individuals spent 
long enough in the broiler business and are ready to retire from farming. Therefore, these 
individuals are less likely to adopt the technology. Adesina and Zinnah, (1993) also finds the 
effect of number of years in the farming to be insignificant on adoption of rice variety.  
The significant positive effect of contact with extension agent on the likelihood of BMP 
adoption (hazard greater than one) indicates that the broiler producers who meet extension agents 
are more likely to adopt BMP as compared to those who do not. The producers exposed to 
information through extension agents have conditional probability of adoption which is 1.32 
times greater than those not exposed to extension agents (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Baptista, 
2000).  
Age of an individual producer is found to be significantly affecting the adoption of other 
technology (Dadi et al. 2004) as well as BMP (Gillespie et al., 2007). The age variable on 
technology adoption has been providing mixed effect on literatures. The younger individuals are 
more likely to adopt new irrigation technology (Koundouri et. al, 2006). However, older 
individuals are more likely to adopt BMP to reduce nutrient pollution (Gillespie et al., 2007). 
The age variable in this study shows significant (at 0.10 level) with a positive sign indicating 
older broiler producer are earlier adopters.  
Ownership of farming practices has been found to influence the adoption decision of 
technology (Rahelizatovo, 2002; Gillespie et al., 2007). If the production is an individual 
operation, the conditional probability of adopting a technology is higher as compared to the 
others. Gillespie et al. (2007) also finds positive effect on adoption if a family owns the farm.  
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Table 3.6: Event dependence and heterogeneity models for BMP adoption (Conditional 
frailty model)  
Variable  
Coefficients 
(Robust Std. Err) 
 
Haz. Ratio 
 
Broiler numbers 
 
0.0013** 
(.0007) 
1.001 
 
Experience 
 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
0.959 
 
Education 
 
0.087 
(0.632) 
1.092 
 
Age 
 
0.031*
 
(0.018) 
1.031 
 
Farm income 
 
0.558 
(0.376) 
1.748 
 
Contd. after retirement 
 
0.311 
(0.479) 
1.365 
 
Ownership 
 
1.310* 
(0.801) 
3.709 
 
Policy  
 
-1.091* 
(0.577) 
0.336 
 
Contact with extension agent 
 
0.843** 
(0.307) 2.323 
Theta 0.00  
Wald test  21.7***  
Log likelihood -117.5  
R square  0.186  
Note:     * , **  and *** stands for the variable is significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance 
respectively. 
Policy dummy to measure the effect of changes in incentive payment as a cost-share is 
found to be highly negative. The unexpected result of this kind to some extent was contributed 
by the within-subject correlation. This is because the magnitude of negative effect reduced to 
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1.09 from 4.669. I therefore, presume that there might be other unobserved factors that affected 
this factor to be negative (Dadi et al. 2004). 
While comparing estimates from the shared frailty model with the conditional frailty 
model the only significant change is found in ownership of the business. The variable changes 
the sign going from shared frailty to the conditional frailty model. In addition, the magnitude of 
negative policy effect becomes smaller on conditional frailty model.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
A slow rate of BMP adoption has been a serious concern among policy makers. Even 
more, the increasingly stringent government regulation has been a fear factor for the producers to 
adopt BMPs. The existing literature on BMP adoption discusses the factors affecting the 
adoption decision of agricultural producers. However, it fails to accommodate the factors related 
to the diffusion process of BMPs over time.  I examined why some producers adopt BMP faster 
than others and what kind of factors affect the time to adoption decision. I employed a duration 
model which accounts for the censored observation. In addition, the model also permits an 
evaluation of the impact of farm and individual characteristics on the duration of adoption from 
the time when the BMP became available. 
The most appealing issue appeared, was the occurrence of multiple adoptions by some 
broiler producers. The correlation among BMP adoptions may arise from individual level 
heterogeneity and/or from event dependence in the presence of multiple adoptions.  In order to 
accommodate the correlation, I employed the variance correction approach which corrected the 
variance covariance matrix to provide better hypothesis testing.  
I allowed individual level heterogeneity to enter the model as a random factor. The result 
showed a presence of heterogeneity by providing the larger variance of the random factor which 
56 
 
entered in the third model (result of which is on table 3.5). The significantly greater variance for 
the random factor suggested the estimates may not be correct since they are affected by the 
presence of heterogeneity and/or event dependence. 
The larger variance only suggests the presence of random effect but fails to indicate 
where the random effect comes from. The random effect may either be from individual 
heterogeneity or from event dependence. I therefore, ran a conditional frailty model, as suggested 
by Box-Steffensmeier (2006), which is assumed to correct both the heterogeneity and event 
dependence allowing different baseline hazards for different rank of adoption. 
The result showed that the longer the farmers spend on broiler production the less likely 
they are to adopt BMPs which are the investment on the programs that are designed for long 
term goals. Larger and more informative farmers, through contact with extension agents and 
education, are early adopters of the new management practices. Even though the result did not 
show significant difference on parameter estimates from all four models, the parameter estimates 
from conditional frailty models are assumed to be more reliable than the estimates from other 
models.  
The study found that the estimates suffered from random effect (frailty) which should be 
taken into consideration while evaluating the factors associated with slow rate of BMP adoption. 
The scope of this approach can be extended to other kinds of technology adoptions in the areas 
of agriculture, for example, adoption of cost minimizing irrigation technology.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IS PRODUCTION TERMINATION A GOOD POLLUTION CONTROL 
ALTERNATIVE?  AN ASSESSMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT VALUES BY 
BROILER PRODUCERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Incentive payments have been a popular policy instrument to motivate agricultural 
producers toward employing environmentally friendly production practices. Wetlands Reserve 
Program (WRP), Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and Environmental Quality Incentive 
Program (EQIP) are the major examples of the incentive payments to support producers to 
employ environmentally friendly agricultural practices. 
The EQIP is established to provide technical and financial support to the farmers who 
agree to adopt environmentally friendly production practices (Classen and Horan, 2000). The 
CRP encouraged the farmers to terminate the commodity production (either by switching to tree 
or perennial grass planting or by idling the land) through incentive payments primarily to reduce 
soil erosion and other negative impacts on ecosystem.  
Other programs such as payment for restricted water use on agricultural production, as 
implemented by the state of Georgia and the Dairy Termination Program (DTP) are additional 
examples where farmers are paid to reduce production amount or cultivated acres. The Draught 
Protection Act of Georgia pays farmers who voluntarily withdraw irrigation permit in lieu of 
compensation to increase water flow in a river. On the other hand, the DTP of 1986-1987 offered 
incentive payments to milk producers who were willing to reduce milk production either 
temporarily (at least for five years) or permanently.  
All of these programs provided incentive payments to the farmers participating 
voluntarily in production termination programs or environmentally friendly agricultural 
practices. Although, the goal of these programs could be one thing (reducing erosion in CRP, 
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reducing water use in agriculture in Georgia’s ground water use incentive program, reducing 
dairy cows numbers in DTP), but these programs resulted other benefits too (increasing 
commodity prices in CRP, water conservation and reduction in crop output in Georgia).   
A similar concept of incentive payments for production termination can be borrowed to 
mitigate water pollution problems associated with broiler production in Louisiana.  Thus, the 
main focus of this chapter remains on the production control program with a direct consequence 
of reducing pollution in a given watershed. Incentive payment is a viable option to motivate 
Louisiana broiler producers to terminate (permanently or temporarily) the broiler production and 
help reduce the water pollution in environmentally sensitive areas. Additionally, the incentive 
payments help farmers to balance farm income while meeting the environmental goal.  
The question remains on how to estimate the dollar amount that represents producers’ 
desired level of incentive that encourages them to participate in a production termination 
program in order to mitigate water pollution in a watershed. In fact, it is difficult to obtain a 
dollar value that a producer desires to receive to terminate the production practices. The dollar 
amount that encourages producers can’t be obtained through market transactions. Contingent 
valuation studies are designed to assess the amount that reflects a minimum monetary amount 
required by the producers to relinquish one unit of broiler production from their current operation 
level. The value is assumed to represent an amount of incentive payment that the farmers require 
if they were to incorporate pollution reduction efforts on their production process. The payment 
level is evaluated based on farmer’s household income, their perception about the governmental 
role on pollution control, and other farm characteristics. 
In order to examine the farmer’s desired level of incentive requirement, a clear 
understanding of their utility function is required. It is because a producer should be paid the 
62 
 
amount that leaves him/her at least indifferent to either continue (remain on same level of utility) 
or to terminate the production practices (move to a new utility level with additional income in the 
form of incentive). I examine producers’ willing to accept (WTA) amount which suffices the 
producers to terminate their production practices and move to a new utility level. 
It is assumed that by terminating the broiler production, the problem of nutrient pollution 
can be mitigated through reduced level of broiler litter. Reducing12  litter production could be 
one of the viable alternatives to save Louisiana watersheds adjacent to and encompassing broiler 
production parishes from nutrient pollution. This chapter highlights the WTA value elicitation 
and examination under the hypothetical but potential governmental policy of production 
termination for pollution reduction.  
This chapter is based on the assumption that the establishment of an appropriate baseline 
incentive payment is important in order to avoid negative consequences of incentive payments 
on either production process or in environmental services. For the purpose, it becomes 
imperative to understand the underlying factors that impact the amount of incentive payments 
that the broiler producers require. I, therefore, estimate a WTA function based on the survey data 
collected from Louisiana broiler producers.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Generally speaking, farmers fail to implement environmentally sound production 
practices because of the perception that pollution reduction efforts provide low personal benefit-
cost ratio. In addition, if negative externalities from farming operations are not properly 
penalized; farmers are less likely to incorporate this externality in the production function as they 
are not liable for the pollution abatement cost. Under such circumstances, one of the approaches 
                                                            
12
   Phytase can be added in the broiler diet which reduces phosphorus content in litter (Bosch et al. 1997 JAAE), 
however, this may not be sufficient to reduce nutrient pollution in a given watershed. 
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to mitigate the water pollution problem is through providing government incentive payments to 
encourage farmers’ production practices with minimum environmental effect (Cooper, 1997; 
Batie, 1999; Classen and Horan, 2000). If the incentive payment is substantial, the likelihood of 
farmers’ participation as well as the acreage enrolled on environmentally friendly production 
practices (Cooper, 1997) becomes significant.  
Broiler farmers are willing to participate in the programs only if the size of the incentive 
payment covers the full cost of participation (Classen and Horan, 2000). Wossink and Swinton 
(2007) examined the cost of producing environmental services. The study showed how 
complementary or substitutive relationships change the cost of producing environmental 
services. Producing environmental service as complementary to market good costs less to the 
producers as compared to the ones produced as substitutes which are produced outside of 
agricultural practices (Wossink and Swinton, 2007). Thus, their study supports the idea of 
bringing the farmer on pollution control programs with substantial amount of incentive payment.   
However, recognizing an appropriate amount of incentive payment becomes difficult. 
Establishing the incentive payment based on individuals’ production function becomes 
inappropriate because of the varied nature of production function. The production cost of 
environmental service depends on farm characteristics such as geographic areas, soil type etc. 
making the prediction difficult (Classen and Horan, 2000).  
The next approach of estimating the incentive payment depends on return from 
agricultural land (Shaikh et al. 2007).  Relying on the amount of return also becomes 
inappropriate since it fails to accommodate nonmarket values, risk attitudes and unobservable 
transaction cost. Thus, determining the baseline payments needed by producers in response to 
establishing environmentally friendly production practices becomes a difficult task.  
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The measure of WTA has widely been used to evaluate compensation requirement to 
keep an individual’s utility at his/her desired level. The method is extensively used for the goods 
lacking a clear market for the good in question. Either WTP or WTA can be employed to elicit 
the value that an individual assign for the goods.  
Goldar and Misra (2001) estimated resident’s WTA values to decrease the number of 
trees in a public park, while, Brox et al. (2003) estimated the values in the context of water 
pollution reduction. The majority of the existing literature focuses on estimating incentive 
payments for environmentally sound production or land use practices. Few examples included 
the studies on land conservation (Amigues et al., 2002); forest and habitat development (Kline et 
al., 2000; Shaikh et al., 2007); water pollution reduction practices (Cooper, 1997; Brox et al., 
2003).  
WTA produce valid estimates of individual’s true compensation required to encourage 
adoption of environment friendly management practices (Goldar and Misra, 2001). Shaikh et al. 
(2007) employed WTA measures to evaluate the compensation required by farmers in order to 
convert marginal land into forest for carbon sequestration. The study found the lower value of 
WTA as compared to the value obtained by another approach. Their study concluded that the 
value elicitation using WTA benefits the government without hurting the utility of producers, 
while setting up the incentive payments. 
  The WTA values elicited using a contingent valuation technique raises the issues of 
hypothetical bias. Studies have focused on the appropriate approaches to deal with the 
hypothetical bias under the field (Goldar and Misra, 2001) as well as experimental settings (Nape 
et al. 2003).  Under a field setting, Golder and Misra (2001) suggested using a functional form 
that accommodates positive bias along with random error to obtain valid estimates for WTA.  
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On the other hand, Nape et al. (2003) conducted an experiment to examine the presence 
of hypothetical bias on WTA value. The study found significant presence of bias on hypothetical 
market setting where individuals do not own the good in question. While the bias was not 
significant if the individuals possessed the good in question before the experiment started (Nape 
et al. 2003). Thus the result implied that the hypothetical bias is less if the concern is over a good 
which an individual possesses. I closely followed their concept on setting up the hypothetical 
market scenario (more will be discussed in the Method section) and involved a good in question 
that the farmer possess. I reduce such bias by incorporating the farmers owned good (the broiler 
production in which the individual’s livelihood is based) in the hypothetical market description.  
The contingent valuation approach is often condemned for eliciting the values that fail to 
represent the true WTP/WTA. In addition to hypothetical bias, zero bid value is very common 
for contingent valuation studies either at open ended or payment card option (Bowker et al. 
2003, Goodwin et al. 1993). Failure to accommodate zero and missing values produces sample 
selection bias leading to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
Bowker et al. (2003) and Goodwin et al. (1993) treated zero bids as if the data was 
censored at zero and employed a tobit model to estimate WTP bid function. However, under the 
contingent valuation scenario, the zero responses are the result of non-observability rather than 
the true censoring (where the censoring at zero may represent some negative values). In that 
case, the use of a tobit model becomes inappropriate (Singelman and Zeng, 1999).     
Strazzera et al. (2003) allowed the zero values by estimating the model in two stages. The 
study employed a two-stage simultaneous equation model to correct for the bias caused by the 
zero responses. Similarly, in response to the existing bias, Amigues et al. (2002) permits the zero 
responses by estimating the model in two stages. The study found that the estimated hypothetical 
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WTP value better represented the true willingness to pay amount when the zero responses were 
treated separately in the model.  
In general, the elicitation of a WTA value has been an accepted approach to assign 
monetary values for nonmarket goods, if estimated using an appropriate methodology. Thus, this 
chapter evaluates the WTA values that encourage broiler producers to participate in pollution 
reduction programs through production termination. This section accommodates a heckman’s 
sample selection model to allow bias. 
III. MODEL 
Economic Model for WTA 
Broiler production is assumed to be a component of an individual’s utility function as it 
generates a portion or whole of their income and provides livelihood. Thus, terminating the 
existing production practices directly affect the individual’s utility level. Therefore, a utility 
theoretic approach is preferred to examine broiler producer’s preferences over current production 
level or reduced production level with an additional income of WTA value.   
The farmers are considered to have strictly quasiconcave utility function defined over a 
quantity constrained good (flocks of broiler), a non-constrained good (numerarie) and money 
income {. The { represents the individual’s household income consisted of farm as well as off-
farm incomes. A broiler producer’s utility function that accommodates an environmental 
component, respondent’s socioeconomic characteristic and payment option is expressed as;    
|} 	 |~, { $ }, }        (4.1) 
|}· defines a broiler producer preferences over market goods and water quality improvement 
through reduction in litter production (measured by reduction in production size). ~ is a vector of 
variables containing farmer’s as well as farm characteristics and } represents the WTA amount 
67 
 
under the proposed policy. } takes the value of zero under the current condition since there has 
been no effort made to reduce pollution production, thus no changes in income is required. } 
represents the water quality which is assumed to be directly affected by production termination. 
The broiler producers are now expected to maximize their utility function |} with respect 
to a constrained budget. However, the individual is faced with the two options, whether to 
produce at the current scale or terminate the production practices with $I as an incentive 
payment. The reduced broiler production is expected to reduce nutrient pollution production and 
help to obtain better water quality (/).   
The utility maximizing individuals desires to receive an incentive level that leaves 
him/her at least better off as he was before the change on production. Suppose, |/ 	
|~, { $ /, / represents the utility level with new production level and positive income 
change assuming T 	 1, while the utility level will be | 	 |~, {,  with no change in 
production level or at current state of production.  
Then an individual will be willing to terminate the production process if the following holds; 
|~, { $ /, /  |~, {,       (4.2) 
Hanneman (1984) suggested that the individual’s utility functions should be treated as random 
variables. Based on Hanneman’s argument, the |/ and | are random utility function that can be 
expressed respectively as; 
P~, { $ /, / $ /  and  P~, {,  $        (4.3) 
P· in equation 4.3 represents the deterministic component and the  and / represent  the 
random error of a respondent’s utility function. P· is defined as individual’s indirect utility 
function either after production termination with an / increase in income, or under the existing 
production practices. It is assumed that the individual then evaluates their utilities at both 
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conditions and decide whether to terminate the production process at given payment of WTA 
value (which is defined as /).    
The individual’s decision on whether he/she would participate in a production 
termination program is observed with following probability distribution.  
Q!+Q9 	 P~, { $ /, / $ /  P~, {,  $     
                                	   / "  P~, { $ /, /  P~, {,  (4.4)  
The terms  and /  are assumed to be independently and identically distributed random errors. 
Once the individual decides whether to participate in the production termination program, he/she 
would decide the desired amount of incentive payment to terminate the production process. 
Econometric Model for WTA 
 The survey collects information on WTA value from the individuals who are willing to 
participate in the production termination program, the observation may be nonrandom. In 
addition, the two responses, whether to participate in the program, and the value that the 
individuals desire to receive so as to terminate the production process, are correlated.  Since the 
WTA values are observed only for the individuals who are interested to participate in the 
pollution reduction program, the elicitation of WTA becomes non-random. A regression on non-
randomly selected samples produces inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Davidson and 
Mackinnon, 1993). Thus, the design of the WTA elicitation on the survey questionnaire requires 
an econometric modeling that fully accounts for the possible correlation between  “Yes/No” 
answer of the participation question and the size of the WTA amount. The information elicitation 
design requires simultaneous explanation of participation decision and WTA function. Therefore, 
a Heckman’s selection model is employed to examine farmers’ decision to participate and pay to 
mitigate nutrient pollution.  
69 
 
 Let’s represent the decision to participate by a binary variable  for an individual .  If 
an individual records a positive WTA value on the survey question  	 1  is assigned while, if 
respondent state WTA value be zero then  	 0 is assigned indicating that he/she is not willing 
to participate in the proposed pollution reduction through production termination.  
The variable   is the individuals’ stated value representing the amount of incentive 
(WTA) that an individual would need to terminate one flock of broiler birds from his existing 
production practices.  
 	 ~7 $         (4.5) 
             	  1 if   00  if  " 0 
 	 ~7 $        (4.6) 
where  	 1,2, … … … ,   represents the number of individuals in the sample. ~ and ~ 
represent the sets of explanatory variables on binary response equation (4.5) and WTA equation 
(4.6). There may be some overlap on variables on the vector ~  and  ~. The  7 and 7  are 
the unknown parameter vectors.  
 The respondent chooses to state  	 1 if the latent variable turns out to be positive. 
Otherwise, the respondent chooses to answer no to the participation question ( 	 0). The 
explanatory variables (~, ~) and the binary response variable,  are always observable 
while the willingness to pay value,  ,  is observed only when  	 1. This makes the error 
terms    and     to be correlated. Thus, ~0,1 and   / 	 q.  
 
m  o ~ 0, ?0  1 J       (4.7) 
 is the standard deviation of   and  is the correlation between   and  . A nonzero 
correlation between the two equations is a result of dependence of  on the respondent’s stated 
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WTA value (). The negative correlation between the    and  implies that the individuals 
who are willing to participate in the production termination program demand smaller WTA as an 
incentive. However, the  and  are independent of the explanatory variables (~ , ~).    
Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
The conditional probability density function of an individual that chooses to participate in 
the production termination program is;  
h| 	 6Φ~78@61  Φ~78/X@     
If an individual accepts to participate in the production termination program, the probability 
density function of the amount of WTA will be;  
 h| 	 1, ~ 	 @M/|@,~@| ~@M/|~   
 
|~~~7 ,  0   
and   	 ~7 $  X0  ~7 $   
where  is independent of ~,  ~0,   1    0 X0,    
 	 1| , ~ 	 Φ,6~7 $ X0  ~781   0 X0X//02 
Now combining all these and taking log of the likelihood function we get the following log 
likelihood function; 
 T  	 1   log61  Φ~78 $  :logΦ £6~7 $ X0 
~781     0 X0XI¤¥ $  log ¦ 6  ~7/8  log< (4.8)  
IV. DATA 
A hypothetical market scenario was developed in order to elicit farmers’ WTA value. The 
respondents were given a scenario of proposed government regulations that require them to 
terminate a portion of production processes in order to meet the water pollution reduction. Then, 
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the respondents were asked how much they desire to receive as an incentive payment from the 
government if they were to comply with the proposed regulation. It is assumed that the 
individuals who answered the WTA questions positively are willing to cooperate with the 
proposed program, while the individuals who either did not respond to that question or listed 
zero as WTA values were assumed to be not interested in the program. Nearly 16% of the 
respondents were non-participants. The approach is consistent with Brox et al. (2003), who 
assume non-response as non-participants. 
Dependent Variable for Participation Equation 
In the first stage, the dependent variable represents whether an individual is interested to 
participate in the production termination program. The variable is operationally defined as 1 if 
the individual responded with a positive amount on WTA question and zero if otherwise. 
Dependent Variable for the WTA Equation 
 WTA represented the amount that an individual is willing to accept as an incentive 
payment in order to trade one flock of broiler birds. The amount is elicited in dollars per flock 
that an individual would terminate the production so as to reduce nutrient pollution generation.  
The average WTA amount was about 4,000 dollars per flock that represents an individual’s price 
to reduce water pollution.  
Explanatory Variables  
The variables that entered the final model are selected based on economics reasoning as 
well as on stepwise regression. A priori economic theory does not guide much about the 
variables affecting the willingness to participate and pay. Therefore, a stepwise selection process 
is employed along with economic reasoning to choose the final set of explanatory variables. 
Table 4.1 presents the list of variables used in the model and the summary statistics.  
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The Number of broilers represents the total number of broiler birds raised by an 
individual producer in 2003. The numbers of broilers are divided by 100,000 for easier 
computational purposes. A larger number of birds imply larger production size. The production 
size is found to be positively related to the willingness to participate in environmentally friendly 
farming practices (Shaikh et al., 2007).  
Herd size showed positive effect on probability of participation in the dairy termination 
program and negative effect on bid value (Gale, 1990) to terminate the dairy production.  
Similarly, the farm size affected the decision to terminate crop production to enroll the land in 
CRP, positively (Boisvert and Chad, 2005). Previous studies have also found that the larger the 
farm size the greater the land retired from the crop production to reduce the adverse effect of 
agricultural production on the environment (Lambert et al., 2007).  
The variable off-farm income measured whether an individual broiler producer has an 
additional income from non-farm activities. Having off-farm income implies additional income 
and therefore financially secured, to seek for other options to comply with pollution regulation 
rather than changing production level. The variable is often found to be significantly affecting 
individuals’ decision to participate in environmentally friendly production practices. 
Respondent’s off-farm income affected the decision to participate in environmentally sound 
practices negatively (Gillespie et al., 2007).  
Fraction of land owned by the broiler grower over total land operated is hypothesized to 
be negatively related to the participation decision as indicated by Rahelizatovo, (2002). Having 
more land allows broiler growers some flexibility on litter application with no or little restriction 
on litter spreading amount and frequencies. Individuals therefore, tend not to seek for other 
alternative solutions for water pollution control measures. 
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Farmer’s own characteristics play a major role in the decision associated with production 
termination to reduce water pollution. The variable Age provided mixed results in previous 
studies. Age is positively associated with the likelihood of environmentally friendly dairy 
production practices (Gillespie et al., 2007), while it is negatively related with production 
termination to enroll land into CRP (Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994; Konyar and Osborn, 
1990). Young farmers are found to be more knowledgeable and more risk taking due to longer 
planning horizons and therefore, are more likely to participate in agricultural practices that 
reduce the negative impact on environment (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993). 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables    
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev. Min Max 
WTA value ($ per flock of  birds) 3961.21 3664.18 0 18750 
Number of broilers/100,000 4.706 3.020 0.18 19 
Individual has off-farm income =1 0.324 0.471 0 1 
Perception that government should pay  
for water conservation, scale 1-5 3.292 1.378 1 5 
If there are housing subdivision in nearby =1 0.108 0.313 0 1 
Ownership of business;  individual owner=1 0.726 0.449 0 1 
Heard about BMP 0.811 0.394 0 1 
Age of farmer at the time of survey 53.284 12.184 25 79 
Farm income up to 49,999 0.315 0.468 0 1 
Farm income from 50,000 to 99,999 0.356 0.482 0 1 
Farm income greater than 99,999 0.233 0.426 0 1 
Willing to participate on the program=1 0.838 0.371 0 1 
Percentage of land owned by the grower 86.092 27.320 0 100 
74 
 
Business ownership is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is individually or 
family owned. Individually owned businesses are assumed to have solo power to make decisions. 
The single ownership makes the individual decide easily but the variable may have either a 
positive or negative effect on participation decision.  
Housing in surroundings is a dummy variable representing whether residential 
subdivisions are located nearby the broiler farm. Deterioration of air quality from the broiler 
litter is one of the major pollution issues associated with broiler production. Complaints of strong 
and objectionable odors have been voiced by the neighbors causing serious legal actions against 
broiler producers (http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/anafobmp.html#Odors; 20th May, 2008). Such 
threat from the nearby residents forces broiler producers to implement appropriate measures to 
reduce the smell problem. Presence of housing subdivisions in the neighborhood is therefore 
assumed to have a significant positive effect on likelihood of participation in pollution 
production termination decision. The variable may have either positive or negative effect on 
WTA amount.  
The producers hesitate to accept that their production practices possess a pollution threat 
to the surface water as well as ground water. Therefore, the farmer’s perception about 
government’s role in pollution control is an important factor to decide whether to participate in 
the pollution control program through private effort of production termination (Hite et al., 2002). 
In order to capture that effect, a scale of individuals’ perception toward government role (1 being 
strongly disagreed and 5 being strongly agreed) is employed. The perception that the government 
should pay for water pollution control programs is treated as continuous which is consistent with 
the approach employed by Brox et al. (2003). The perception is hypothesized to affect the 
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participation decision negatively. In addition, the WTA amount to trade a flock is assumed to 
increase, if the producers don’t see their production practices as a threat to the water resources.     
Awareness about the alternative practices was constructed by employing a dummy 
variable to indicate whether an individual has heard about BMP. This represents whether the 
respondent has only heard about the BMP or has implemented the practices. The variable is then 
used as proxy for his/her general knowledge about the availability of alternative practices that 
can be implemented to reduce nutrient runoff. Thus, the availability of substitutes is assumed to 
have a negative effect on production termination.  
Farm income is defined as the household income generated from the broiler industry. 
Based on the existing literature, it is not clear what effect the farm income has on the willingness 
to participate in a production termination program to secure better environmental quality. Farm 
income showed negative effect in accepting to participate on production termination to develop 
forest land (Shaikh, et al, 2007).  
In this study, farm income is defined in five categories at the interval of $50,000 starting 
from “negative profit up to $50,000”, “$0 to $49’999”, “$50,000 to $99,999”, “$100,000 to 
$149,999” and “greater than or equal to $150,000.” Producers with higher farm income are 
financially more secure as compared to others and are less interested in forgoing the production 
to reduce water pollution. The individuals with high farm income may spend on pollution 
abatement technology instead of termination of ongoing production practices. In addition, the 
farmer who generates more farm income expects higher incentive payment if he has to forgo his 
production to reduce nutrient generation. 
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V. RESULT AND DISSCUSSION 
The data show that nearly 16% of respondents are willing to accept zero amounts in order 
to participate in the production termination program. The zero bid response is common for 
contingent valuation studies (Bowker et al., 2003; Goodwin et al., 1993). However, observing 
zero bid values in WTA to trade a flock with cleaner water quality may not imply that the 
respondents are willing to sell a flock of birds at zero prices.13  
It is therefore assumed that the zero value originates from first stage of decision where an 
individual decides whether/not to participate in the pollution reduction program (Strazzera et al., 
2003, Cho, et al., 2005). Then, at the second stage, the individual decides how much he/she 
requires as incentive payments to forgo their production practices. Thus, the respondents having 
zero bid values on contingent valuation questions are considered to be not interested in 
terminating the broiler production to reduce pollution generation. The term  is then considered 
to be unity if an individual responded positively to the WTA question and zero otherwise.                                                             
The WTA amount is observed only if the individuals are interested in participating in the 
program or if the   0. For the contingent valuation question the   represents the dollar 
amount that an individual desires to receive so as to terminate one flock of birds for better water 
quality. The average value of WTA is about $3,960 whereas the profit from one flock is $1,400 
the latter of which is estimated by the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station.   
The selection nature of data collection gives rise to an estimation problem since the errors 
in the two decision process (participation and WTA value) are correlated. Excluding the non-
participants from the analysis, or using only the positive WTA values produces an inconsistent 
estimation of parameters (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
                                                            
13
   The exact format of WTA question as asked in the survey favors running a random effect probit model.  
However, respondents provided only a limited number of choices.  Lack of variation was the main reason to 
abandon a RE probit model. 
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Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest employing a heckman’s selection model using 
two-step estimation process in order to test the hypotheses of a no selection bias. The hypothesis 
of “absence of selection bias” can be tested by checking whether the coefficient of inverse mills 
ratio is significantly different than zero. The result indicates that the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at 10% level of significance. Since, the null hypothesis of “no sample 
selection effect” is rejected, the ordinary least square (OLS) process produces biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates for WTA (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Baum, 2006).  
With the rejection of sample selection hypothesis, and the nature of sample selection 
process in data collection, I used heckman’s sample selection models for the analysis. It is 
recommended to employ maximum likelihood estimation of sample selection models (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993) once the hypothesis of selection bias is rejected using two-step 
procedure.  
A priori economic theory fails to provide enough guidance to decide which variable 
should be included either in participation or on WTA equation. Since, it is unlikely that the 
individual’s decision to participate and his WTA amount are determined by the different sets of 
covariates, a variable selection model is also employed. The selection starts from the full set of 
variables. The variables significant at 0.30 were allowed in the Heckman sample selection 
model. In addition, the demographic variables that failed to generate the Z values of at least one 
were simultaneously dropped from the model. The process is consistent with variable selection 
process employed by Brox et al. (2003). In addition, the variables that were selected in the 
selection process but didn’t meet the convergence criteria at maximum likelihood estimation 
approach were also dropped from the model. At the end of the variable selection trial, farm 
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income, broiler number, housing in nearby, asset liability ratio and age were kept for the first 
stage probit model. The results from the final model are presented on tables 4.2 and 4.3.  
Table 4.2 provides the parameter estimates and their standard errors associated with the 
binary choice of participation decision. The first step of the analysis estimated the decision 
equation of whether to participate (or not to participate) on the proposed pollutant reduction 
program. The only variables that came out to be insignificant, on the first step probit regression, 
are farm size measured by broiler number and the dummy representing whether there is/are 
housing subdivision/s near the broiler farm.  
Turning to the specific determinants of WTA value (Table 4.3) that motivates the 
individuals to participate on the program, it is noticed that production size, farm and off-farm 
income, individual’s perception about government’s role in water pollution, ownerships of farm, 
and knowledge about alternative pollution control programs are the significant factors affecting 
stated willingness to accept value. In fact almost all of the variables are significant at least at ten 
percent level of significance. The only variables that are not significant are the dummies for 
income level that falls between 50,000 to 99,999; existence of housing subdivisions in the 
surrounding areas and the age of principal operator at the time of survey.  
The off-farm income is often found to be a significant variable in an individual’s decision 
to participate in environmentally friendly production practices. This study also showed that the 
participation decision is negatively affected by the level of off-farm income. Lambart et al. 
(2007) also found the off-farm income is negatively associated with production termination 
decision. An individual, who has off-farm income, is less likely to participate in the conservation 
reserve program (Lambert et al., 2007) by terminating their production practices. Further, 
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Gillespie et al. (2007) find a negative impact of individuals having off-farm income on 
implementing pollutant reducing agricultural practices.  
The fraction of land owned over total land operated for agriculture was hypothesized to 
be negatively related to the participation decision as indicated by Rahelizatovo (2002). The result 
supported the hypothesis showing that a one percentage point increase in the fraction of owned 
land decreases the likelihood of participation in flock trading for pollution control program by 
0.07. The individuals, who own a larger fraction of total operated land, are more flexible on 
spreading litter on their own crop and pasture land. Excess nutrients from broiler litter become a 
problem only if there are not enough crops and pasture lands to absorb the plant nutrient from 
applied litter. If a farmer owns enough land to absorb nutrient content from all the litter produced 
from broiler production, there is no need to terminate the broiler production. Therefore, the 
individuals who own a larger percentage of land tend not to participate in pollutant reduction 
programs through production termination.  
Further, the result indicated that the older individuals are less likely to participate in the 
production termination to help reduce pollution production. The result is contradictory to the 
assumption that older individuals are near to the retirement and would be attracted by the 
concept of production termination. On the other hand, it is also true that older farmers have less 
flexibility in finding a job after terminating the ongoing farming operation. The older farmers 
have shorter time horizon for recouping the profession change, it is more likely for farmers to be 
less attracted toward terminating broiler production. The existing studies related to farmers’ 
behavior to cope with pollution reducing programs also suggest that older farmers are less 
cooperative to the programs designed for achieving better environment (Gilespie, et al., 2007; 
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Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994). The result implies that the older farmers prefer not to 
modify the production practices with the tools that are designed for long term goals.   
Table 4.2: The determinants of willingness to participate: binary variable §¨ 
WTA value ($) Coefficient Std. Err. 
Number of broilers/100000 0.158       0.109 
Individual has off-farm income =1 -1.212** 0.635 
Percentage of land owned by the grower -0.066** 0.029 
Ownership of business; individual owner =1 -1.011    0.635 
Perception that government should pay for water 
conservation in the scale of 1-5 -0.614** 0.266 
If there are housing subdivision in nearby =1 0.106 1.291 
Age of farmer at the time of survey -0.094*** 0.036 
Heard about BMP -1.369** 0.615 
Constant 14.532*** 4.821 
Pseudo R-square 0.419 
LR chi2(8)       25.54  
Prob > w©0      0.001 
Note:     * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The result showed that the perception among producers believe that government should 
pay farmers in order to encourage pollution reduction efforts and reduces the likelihood of 
farmers’ participation. The individuals who strongly believe that government should pay for 
water pollution control programs are less likely to participate in the production termination 
program to mitigate water pollution problems. The result is supported by the finding of Hite et 
al. (2002) who found that the producers don’t accept their production practices possess a 
pollution threat to the environment and should bear a responsibility for cleaning up. In addition, 
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the WTA amount to trade a flock for better water quality increases, if the producers don’t see 
their production practices as a threat to the water resources. The result showed a significant 
positive impact of the perception on stated WTA value.   
The proxy for an individual’s knowledge (heard about BMP) about the availability of 
alternative practices showed negative effect on the likelihood of production termination. An 
individual who has heard about the BMP is less likely to participate in the proposed production 
termination program (Table 4.2) as compared to the ones who are not. Further, these individuals 
stated greater value to the willingness to accept the amount to trade one flock of broiler (4.3). 
The result implied that if the individuals who are aware of other alternatives (such as BMP) to 
reduce pollution tend not to participate in the production termination program and also state a 
greater amount of WTA. 
The number of broiler raised in a year, which represented the size of the production is 
found to be an important variable to determine the level of incentive payment that an individual 
expects to receive. The result showed that the size of production is negatively related to the 
stated value of WTA (Table 4.3) and positively related to the likelihood of participation (Table 
4.2). The result implies that the larger broiler producers are more likely to participate in the 
program and need lower incentive payments if they were to forgo their production practices 
either partially or fully to meet the pollution reduction goal.  
The finding is consistent with Lambart et al. (2007) who find larger farmers have more 
flexibility with respect to land use decision. Therefore, they are willing to retire a larger portion 
of land from crop production. Production size was also found to be negatively affecting the 
incentive amount to enroll production land into the CRP program (Boisvert and Chang, 2005) 
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and positively affecting the likelihood of participation on CRP enrollment (Boisvert and Chang, 
2005; McLean-Meynsse et al. 1994) and pollution reduction programs (Rahelizatovo, 2002). 
Table 4.3: The determinants of WTA: Sample selection and no-selection models for (ª¨) 
 Variables 
 
OLS selection OLS no-selection 
Coefficient. Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Number of broilers/100000 -274.557** 125.480 -192.035 138.061 
Individual has off-farm income =1 2694.798*** 878.997 1699.734 1156.593 
Perception that government should pay for 
water conservation in the scale of 1-5 1058.141*** 298.298 729.680** 337.543 
If there are housing subdivision in nearby 
=1 507.206 1219.757 -732.914 1298.205 
Ownership of business; individual owner=1 1575.931** 815.770 1608.133* 909.450 
Heard about BMP 1992.005** 1039.751 2805.682*** 1083.750 
Age of farmer at the time of survey -20.677 33.751 -53.384 40.207 
Farm income upto 49,999 3469.184*** 1408.545 3789.173** 1778.140 
Farm income upto 50,000 to 99,999 1737.143 1398.063 1530.968 1437.255 
Farm income greater than 99,999 2643.502* 1452.289 2354.555* 1473.871 
Constant -2681.595 2832.887 -822.357 3645.072 
 1228.824 1036.837 ---- ---- 
 0.474 0.418 ---- ---- 
 2589.440 257.116 ---- ---- 
No of observations 70 67 
Censored 11  
Uncensored 59  
Wald w/0  50.55***   
/,«¬ 2.34**  
Note:     * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.  is significant at 0.069 
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In general, the result implies that the larger farmers are more responsive to the water 
pollution issues and potential government regulations to mitigate the nutrient pollution problem. 
Specifically, in the present context, the result may imply that the larger farmers fear from the 
potential government regulation (for example, CAFO affects the larger producers more than the 
smaller producers) and therefore, like to decrease the flock size at lower WTA value so as to 
avoid dealing with the regulations.  
There are four income dummies in the regression model. The first level stated whether 
the firm is running at a loss and is employed as a reference group. The result showed that the 
individuals earning less than $50,000 net farm income desire a higher amount of WTA value as 
compared to the individual who face up to $50,000 loss per year. The third level of farm income 
also showed significant positive impact on WTA value. The producers who earn up to $50,000 
farm income per year require about $3,470 per flock per year in order to terminate the production 
program as compared to the individuals who bear loss up to $50,000. The farmers with more 
than $100,000 farm profit also showed significant positive impact on stated value of WTA. 
Surprisingly, the second level of income category showed insignificant impact on stated value of 
WTA.  It may be that these groups of farmers are indifferent between participating and 
nonparticipating as they are comfortable with their level of production and the income from the 
production.   
The , which represents the cross equation correlation, is positive. The result indicates 
that individuals are interested to terminate their production practices only if they receive a 
sufficient amount of incentive payment. The positive effect of perception that government should 
pay for water pollution control programs also supports this finding. The positive correlation is 
also consistent with the finding of Hite et al. (2002) who conclude farmers don’t agree their 
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production practices contribute to nutrient pollution and hesitate to invest in pollution reduction 
practices. However, Brox et al. (2003) found a negative relationship between the decision to 
participate in pollution reduction program and stated WTA value. 
In general the maximum likelihood approach is preferred to the two-step procedure for 
the sample selection model because of the non-identification and collinearity problem in two-
step procedure. Identification problem of Heckman two-step procedure originates from the 
inclusion of inverse mill’s ratio in second step estimation. It is also argued that the imprecision 
of the heckman’s two-step estimation originates from severe collinearity originated from 
inclusion of inverse mills ratio (Leung and Yu, 1996; Wooldridge, 2002).  
The two-step approach of heckman’s selection model may not perform well when the 
selection equation (participation) and output equation (WTA) are highly correlated (Leung and 
Yu, 2000; Nawata, 1994). For the diagnosis of collinearity, the inverse mills ratio obtained from 
the first step probit selection model is regressed against explanatory variables on the WTA 
equation (Nelson, 1984; Leung and Yu, 1996). The R-square value from this regression is used 
to measure the magnitude of collinearity. The result showed the value of R square to form 
auxiliary regression to be 0.433 is the evidence of collinearity supporting the use of the 
maximum likelihood estimation (Leung and Yu, 1996). The regression of the inverse mills ratio 
on all explanatory variables and correlation matrix are presented in Appendix C. 
Even though maximum likelihood estimation approach is preferred the analysis is also 
conducted using two-step procedure, because of following two reasons.  
1. In a small sample, the maximum likelihood estimates tend to have larger parameter 
bias than those of two-step approach (Leung and Yu, 1996).  
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2.  Hypothetical bias is a serious problem in contingent valuation studies. In presence of 
errors on measuring the dependent variable, MLE produces inconsistent estimates. On 
the other hand, using two-step procedures, the errors due to the hypothetical bias is 
absorbed into the disturbance term of the output (WTA) equation. Thus, the two-step 
procedure may provide better parameter estimates (Stapleton and Young, 1984) as 
compared to maximum likelihood estimates.  
The results from the two step model produced similar conclusion while the standard 
errors are larger for some of the variables. The result from the two-step procedure is presented in 
Appendix C. 
Expected value of WTA is estimated using the parameter estimates obtained from 
Heckman’s MLE approach. The model estimated the broiler farmers’ WTA value to terminate 
the production process to be $4,720 with standard deviation of $2,659. The average net income 
from one flock of broiler production is listed to be only $1,400. The fixed cost associated with 
broiler houses and other fixed assets that can’t be used for other production purposes might be 
the main reason to overestimate the cost of production termination.    
VI. CONCLUSION  
This study provides an insight over the factors to be considered before setting up the 
incentive payments which encourages broiler producers to terminate production practice. 
Establishing the appropriate baseline incentive payment is important to avoid unintended 
negative consequences of governmental incentive payments. The factors that affect broiler 
producer’s decision to cooperate with water pollution reduction programs are evaluated using 
Heckman’s sample selection model.  
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Size of the farm, measured by the number of broiler birds raised per year, significantly 
affected the size of WTA value. Larger farmers are more serious about water pollution and 
potential regulation and thus state a lower WTA values to help reduce water pollution. On the 
other hand, the significant positive effect of perception that government should pay farmers to 
participate in pollution abatement programs suggested that a sufficient economic incentive is 
required to encourage farmers to participate in environmentally friendly production practices.  
This study will be novel in the area of environmental economics in the sense that it 
incorporated the farmers’ attitude toward nutrient pollution reduction programs. However, past 
studies mainly focused on WTA for conservation programs.  This analysis is also important 
because a very little is known about the broiler producers’ attitude and willingness to participate 
in the pollution reduction programs. And the understandings of the factors that affect farmer’s 
interest to participate on those programs are critical for the success of national and state level 
policy formulation in order to mitigate water pollution.    
One of the strongest assumptions made in this chapter is that the individuals who have 
listed their WTA as zero value are assumed as non participants. This assumption carries a valid 
argument that the goods in question is flock of broiler birds and it is unconvincing that broiler 
producer would terminate production of a flock at zero price. In addition, with the small size of 
the dataset in hand and fear of losing valid statistical information, I decided not to drop the 
observations with zero value on WTA question.  
The lack of response commonly originates from protest votes; incomplete information to 
the producers etc. Further, with the smaller sample size, the maximum likelihood estimates may 
produce biased parameter estimates than those obtained from two step estimation process. 
Therefore, the estimates from two-step estimation approach are also presented in Appendix C, 
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however the conclusion drawn is not different from that obtained using maximum likelihood 
method. 
This study focuses on whether broiler producers are willing to participate on production 
termination program to mitigate water pollution and what would be the incentive level that 
suffices to encourage farmers to participate in the programs. However, this study does not focus 
in the magnitude of pollution reduction from the level of production termination. The question of 
how many flocks should be cut off to achieve desired level of water quality is determined by the 
target of water quality requirement in a given watershed, which is beyond the scope of this study.   
While using this result one should be cautious about the level of incentive payment on the 
unintended effect of larger incentive on production termination. Studies have also indicated 
larger incentive payments may produce unwarranted negative effect on production termination.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BROILER PRODUCERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO REDUCE WATER 
POLLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) and 
Environmental Quality Incentive Programs (EQIP) encourage farmers to participate in pollution 
control programs. The NRCS/USDA provides technical and/or financial support to help 
implement environmentally friendly production practices. Besides voluntary adoption of 
environmentally friendly practices, broiler producers also face regulations for Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFO) and Animal Feeding Operations (AFO) which require them 
to follow pollution control measures and restrict the level of pollution. The common goal of 
these policy instruments and regulations is to bring polluters on pollution reduction processes. 
The current environmental policy encourages farmers to implement pollution control practices 
voluntarily unless the farmers are CAFOs or AFOs.  
It is widely accepted that the economic incentives/disincentives play a major role in 
encouraging producers to participate in environmentally benign production practices (Tarui and 
Polasky, 2005). In this chapter, I examined the level of economic disincentives that encourage 
(force) farmers to internalize the pollution control measures into their production practices. I 
assessed the concept of disincentives for polluters to enforce pollution control efforts on 
polluters’ production decision. For the purpose, I estimated the maximum dollar amount that can 
be charged as pollution abatement cost for an individual allowing him/her to be indifferent from 
existing utility level. The amount is represented by the individual’s willing to pay (WTP) value 
for pollution control/abatement measures and continue his production practices at the current 
scale.   
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It is well established that the amount representing the producer’s affordability or 
willingness to pay to control water pollution becomes difficult to derive through market 
transactions. Therefore, I employed a contingent valuation approach to examine the affordability 
(or willingness to pay for water pollution control measures) of Louisiana broiler producers based 
on their household income; their perception about the need of environmental regulations; and 
other farm level characteristics.  
The broiler producer’s desired willingness to pay level can be evaluated through a clear 
understanding of their utility function. The contingent valuation approach elicits the amount that 
the individual would be willing to pay and remains on his/her existing utility level. Using 
contingent valuation approach, I created a hypothetical scenario of potential governmental 
regulation that can be implemented if the broiler producers fail to accommodate environmentally 
friendly production practices. Afterward, I obtained the individual’s bid amount for controlling 
water pollution. It is assumed that the individuals’ stated WTP value will be an appropriate 
approximation of disincentive/tax payment that can be imposed to internalize pollution control 
effort into producers cost function.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The continuous and evolving nature of environmental regulations and its adverse effect 
on profit level forces farmers to search for alternative solutions to mitigate increased water 
pollution. Increased number of regulated CAFO/AFO operations and strengthened permit 
requirements (EPA, 2003) for these operations are the examples of government being more 
stringent on water quality regulations. Meantime, the BMP adoptions and obeying the CAFO and 
AFO regulations are the examples of farmers being more concerned about the regulation and 
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standards. Thus, the perceived threat of stringent regulation convinced the producers to 
implement environmentally friendly production practices with no/partial amount of cost-share.  
Large scale producers falling under CAFO and some AFO operations are forced to 
employ environmentally benign production practices to comply with the permit requirements 
(EPA, 2003). Even though the increased number of regulated CAFO and AFO showed 
ambiguous results on reducing water pollution (Mullen and Center, 2004) the producers are 
required to abide by these regulations. In order to avoid the potential punishment, agricultural 
producers attempt to invest on environmentally friendly practices. This implies that the farmers 
are willing to pay (forced to pay) some amount in order to avoid potential harsh governmental 
regulations (to reduce water pollution) and continue the existing production practices. 
The question remains how much the broiler producer will be willing/ able to afford to 
reduce water pollution. The contingent valuation approach (WTP) measure has been employed in 
a wide variety of research where non-market goods are involved (Urama and Hodge, 2006; 
Whitehead, 2006; Cho et al. 2005; Strazzera, et al. 2003; Hudson and Hite, 2003; Hite et al., 
2002; Roach, et al., 2002; Whitehead et al., 2001; Stevens et al., 2000; Loomis et al. 1998; 
Hanemann, 1984).  
The approach has also been employed to elicit an individual’s willingness to pay amount 
for water quality improvements (Whitehead, 2006; Brox et al. 2003; Hite et al. 2002; Whitehead, 
2002; Cooper 1997). Whitehead (2006) examined the WTP value for water quality improvement 
from the consumer’s point of view accommodating heterogeneity due to perceived water quality 
levels. On the other hand, Hite et al. (2002) evaluated the value of water quality improvement, 
from the producers’ point of view.  
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The CV technique is based on the assumption that the maximum amount of money that 
an individual desires to pay represents their maximum WTP value for the purpose of controlling 
water pollution. Hite et al. (2002) found that the producer’s marginal willingness to pay for 
pollution reduction decreased with an increased level of desired pollution reduction. According 
to Hite et al. (2002) the decrease in marginal WTP is due to the fact that the agricultural 
producers tend not to believe their production practices contribute enough to cause water 
pollution problems. In addition, the authors state that the level of direct benefit received from 
water quality improvements also affected the amount of stated WTP by farmers. 
It can be argued that the producers are motivated enough (either due to regulation threat 
or voluntarily) to pay for pollution control measures. Then, the contingent valuation approach 
becomes a relevant tool to extract the actual amount that an individual farmer is willing to pay to 
avoid harsh environmental regulations. For a non-market commodity like water pollution, this 
approach is a satisfactory technique to elicit the present value of a proposed policy even though 
Hoen and Randall (1987) assert that the approach as “not a flawless approach”. 
 The main concern with the contingent valuation approach becomes the development and 
framing of the questionnaire. The contingent valuation questions usually follow dichotomous 
choice responses where individuals are asked whether to vote (yes/no) for the proposed bid 
options (Herriges and Shogren, 1996). The dichotomous choice questions are found to be 
suffering from the anchoring effect (Herrisen and Shogren, 1996) drawing invalid conclusion.  
With the anchoring effect in consideration, multiple bound questions gained popularity in 
the recent years (Welsh and Poe, 1998; Alberini, et al. 2003). The multiple bound questions 
provide a list of bid amounts from where a respondent chooses to represent his WTP value. 
Some authors argue that providing a list of alternative bids reduces the focus of respondents on 
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single bid or sequential bids and therefore reduces the anchoring effect (Whitehead, 2002; Roach 
and Boyle, 2002; Rowe et al., 1996. In addition, literature also established that the double and 
multiple bound questioning approaches increase the efficiency of parameter estimates 
(Whitehead 2002; Alberini et al. 2003).  
In double and multiple bound questions, given the dichotomous type response, logit or 
probit models have mostly been used in contingent valuation studies (Whitehead et al., 2001). 
Alberini et al. (2003) used a random effect logit model to estimate the WTP value from the 
multiple bound contingent valuation technique. The main goal of the study however, was to 
understand questionnaire design rather than estimating the expected value of WTP for open-
water fishing.  
Brox et al. (2003) estimated willingness to pay to improve water quality and allowed a 
non-response bias in the model. The respondent’s WTP value was elicited using the payment 
card approach and heckman’s two step model was employed to correct the observed sample 
selection bias.   Urama and Hodge (2006) estimated WTP for mitigating soil and water 
degradation problems focusing on the effect of education on WTP values. 
Similarly, Whitehead (2002) employed random effect probit models on double, triple and 
multiple bound questions. The precision of WTP value increased with multiple bond questions in 
the contingent valuation approach (Whitehead, 2002). Whitehead focused that the double bound 
questionnaire format provided better estimates for true WTP when a starting value of an 
individual’s bid is difficult to assign to represent the distribution of WTP values. Roach et al. 
(2002) also claimed an increased efficiency in parameter estimates with multiple bound 
questionnaire setting. 
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Along the vein of Whitehead (2002), providing starting value of WTP to the broiler 
producers while eliciting WTP becomes relatively difficult since no guideline exists to suggest 
potential value that an individual would be willing to pay. Due to such facts and also because of 
the anchoring effect in a single bound question, a multiple bound question format was found to 
be attractive in this study.  
III. MODEL 
Economic Model for WTP  
A rational broiler producer  is expected to choose a combination of market goods  and 
water pollution control measures to maximize utility given a limited budget {. A simple utility 
function that accommodates an environmental component, the respondent’s demographic 
characteristics, net income, as well as a payment vehicle defines the broiler producers’ 
preferences over market goods and environmental quality. Given the utility framework, an 
individual’s utility function is explained by;  
|} 	 |~, {  }, }      (5.1) 
 The { represents the individual’s household income, which includes farm as well as off 
farm income net of existing tax. ~ represents a vector of variables describing the characteristic of 
individuals as well as their farm. } is the change in tax under the proposed water pollution 
reduction policy and } represent of water quality level under current condition or proposed 
policy. 
  Hanemann (1984) developed a utility theoretical framework to derive WTP and WTA 
from a dichotomous choice discrete response in contingent valuation studies. Based on 
Hanemann’s argument, let’s assume two possible levels of water quality represented by T 	
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0, 1.  T 	 0 represents an initial or the existing level of water quality whereas, and T 	 1 
represents the level of improved water quality.  
 At the status quo of no water pollution reduction effort, the broiler producers receive 
utility | 	 |~, {, . For water quality at the the current conditions since no changes in 
payment are required, the } becomes zero. Accordingly, for proposed policy, a change in net 
income is expected which changes the utility function as |/ 	 |~, {  /, /. This 
represents the broiler producer’s utility function with improved water quality and change in net 
income through change in tax (/).  
 Hanemann (1984) argues that an individual know his/her utility function while it is 
unknown to the researchers. Therefore, an individual’s utility function is consisted of empirically 
measureable component P· and stochastic econometric error  }. Thus, individuals’ standard 
utility functions with (equation 5.2) and without (equation 5.3) proposed change are expressed 
as;  
 |/ 	 P~, {  /, /  $  /      (5.2) 
 | 	 P~, {,  $        (5.3) 
 It is assumed that broiler producers compare the utilities under current (equation 5.3) and 
proposed water quality and net income scenario (equation 5.2). The underlying reasoning of the 
individual’s choice of whether to maintain status quo of no water pollution or undertake a water 
pollution control measures to improve water quality is based on the following condition;  
 P~, {  /, /  $  /  P~, {,  $     (5.4) 
 The model implies that an individual compares the proposed improvement on water 
quality and change in net income, with current condition, and evaluates the difference on utilities 
under both of the plans. It is assumed that the individual then decides whether to pay or how 
97 
 
much to pay for the proposed program so as to keep the utility level unchanged (negligibly 
changed). The difference in utility under current and proposed conditions can be expressed as; 
 %| 	 P~, {  /, /  $  /  P~, {,  $           
                    	 P~, {  /, /   P~, {,     /  
                    	 %­     /        (5.5)  
Where the errors  and / are assumed to be identically and independently distributed with zero 
means.  
Econometric Models for WTP 
a) Ordered Response Model  
It is assumed that the broiler producers compare the proposed water quality improvement 
with the existing water quality. They, then assess the difference in utility from the two water 
quality levels. The individual producers then define their utility difference in terms of WTP. 
Based on this criterion, an individual respondent decides the amount of dollars that he/she is 
willing to pay.   
The broiler producers are given three payments intervals (less than $300; $300-$500; and 
greater than $500) and asked where their WTP value falls. Suppose the payment levels are 
represented by an ordinal scale ®. If the respondents’ WTP value is below $300 then ® takes a 
value of 1; if the utility difference falls within $300 and $500, ® is 2; and if the WTP value is 
greater than $500 then ® takes the value of 3. The data allows estimation of parameters using 
probit models (Boccaletti and Nardella, 2001; Jin et al., 2008).  
For econometric purpose, the latent value of WTP takes the three values as follows 
(Johnston, 1999; Jin et al., 2008);  
 WTP 	 1        if    WTP " q/  
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 WTP 	 2        if    q/ # WTP " q0  
 WTP 	 3        if    WTP  q0       (5.6) 
Where  q represents unobserved threshold parameters that outline the interval where utility 
difference falls and the WTP represents the utility difference. The qO  determines the boundary 
where the value of WTP map into the given differences in utility (Davidson, 1993).  
Let the  WTP is defined by; 
WTP 	 ~7 $          (5.7) 
~7 	 5 $ 5/ °V°±°UUT $ 50UTTQV9 $ 5²UhhU³9 $ 5´ QV9 $  5«T9!TQ%
$  5¬UQ $ 5µ+9!9+U 
Where, the stochastic error ¶ is assumed to have standard normal distribution with mean zero 
and variance of one. The errors are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The 7 
represents a vector of parameters to be estimated and ~ represents a vector of individual as well 
as farm characteristics.   
 Now based on the equations 5.2 to 5.7 the probability that the utility difference falls in a 
given interval of WTP value is expressed as; 
 WTP 	 1  	 WTP # q/  
                                          	 ~7 $   # q/  
                                          	    # q/  ~7      
                                          	  Φq/  ~7        
Similarly, the probability that · 	 2 is; 
 WTP 	 2  	  q/ " WTP # q0  
                                          	   q/ " ~7 $   # q0  
                                          	    # q0  ~7    # q/  ~7  
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                                          	  Φq0  ~7 Φq/  ~7  
And the probability that · 	 3 is; 
 WTP 	 3  	  WTP  q0    
                                          	  ~7 $    q0  
                                         	     q0  ~7                                           	  Φ~7  q0     (5.8) 
where,  is probability operator. Provided all these probability density functions for , the 
unknown model parameters can be estimated by maximizing the following log likelihood 
function; 
ℓ q/ q0, 7 	 ∑ log6Φq/  ~78WTP@M/ $ ∑ log 6Φq0  ~7 Φq/ WTP@M0
~78 $ ∑ logxΦD~7  q0FzWTP@M²      (5.9) 
 The effects of changes in explanatory variables on the probability of WTP falling in a 
given range are not explained by the estimated coefficients (Greene, 2008) in case of probit/logit 
models. It is therefore, the effects of explanatory variables are expressed in terms of marginal 
effects which can be derived as follows;  
 
¸WTPM/|¹¸¹ 	 ¦~77    
 
¸WTPM0|¹¸¹ 	 ¦~7  ¦q  ~77    
 
¸WTPM²|¹¸¹ 	 ¦q  ~77        (5.10) 
 The marginal effect is the slope of curve that relates an explanatory variable to 
WTP 	 ®|º controlling the effects of other variables (Long, 1997). 
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b) Interval Regression Model 
The boiler producer’s WTP value in this study is coded by an interval where an 
individual’s latent value · falls. The upper and lower limits of the interval are known to the 
respondent as well as to the researcher. Such data collection approach replaces the unknown q by 
known cell limits, Q/ and Q0 and define WTP as in equation 5.11. Wooldridge (2002) suggests 
an interval regression to estimate  ·|º when the upper and lower limits of the intervals are 
known (Whitehead et al., 2001; Doorslaer and Jones, 2003). Instead of estimating 7 and q as in 
ordered logit/probit model, the interval regression estimates the parameters 7 and 0, where 
0 	 PQ!WTP|º. The model assumes ·|º~Normalº7, 0 instead of standard normal for 
probit and logistic for logit regressions.  
The likelihood function given in equation 5.9 changes into the following form when the 
upper and lower limits of the interval are known.  
ℓ 7, 0 	 ∑ log mΦ :»I – º¨7½¤ <oWTP@M/ $ ∑ log mΦ :»¤ – º¨7½¤ < Φ :»I – º¨7½¤ <oWTP@M0    $
∑ log mΦ :º¨7 X »¤½¤ <oWTP@M²             (5.11) 
IV. DATA 
The third section of the data provide three bid categories where broiler producer’s 
willingness to pay values falls. The multiple bound questionnaire setting seems appropriate in 
this context at least for the following two reasons; 
• The tendency of yea saying to the given value even though the true WTP is 
less/greater than the provided can be reduced (Roach et al. 2002), 
• The double and multiple bounded dichotomous choice models provide better 
parameter estimates than the single bounded model (Whitehead, 2002; Hanemann, et 
al. 1991).  
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 The individuals’ chosen WTP is assumed to represent the amount that the broiler 
producers were willing to pay if the money would be implemented on pollution abatement. The 
amount is elicited in dollars per flock.   The amount per flock is asked as there is too much asset 
specificity in broiler production and an integrator makes decision on whether to put more birds 
or not after each flock based on the performance of broiler producers (Vukina and 
Leegomonchai, 2006).  
Explanatory Variables  
It is assumed that individuals gain utility both from water quality improvements as well 
as from his/her net income. The observable characteristics that have positive/negative impact on 
an individual’s preferences for water quality control measures include socioeconomic as well as 
farm characteristics.   
Farmer’s demographic characteristics play a major role in the decision associated with 
water pollution and environmentally friendly production practices. Based on previous studies, 
respondent’s Age is one of the important factors to impact the WTP decision (Hanemann, 1991). 
The age measures the producer’s age at the time of data collection and is found to have mixed 
effect.  
Koundouri et al. (2006) found the age of the respondent affected the willingness to invest 
on producing better environment quality, negatively. Younger farmers were more knowledgeable 
and more risk taking due to a longer planning horizon and therefore, were more likely to 
participate in environmentally friendly agricultural practices in a study conducted by Adesina 
and Zinnah (1993). The argument is also supported by Brox et al. (2003). 
Level of education and contact with extension agents are employed to capture the effect 
of information effect on WTP value. The producers who have better information on issues and 
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importance of water quality through education are more likely to contribute toward 
environmental practices (Koundouri et al., 2006). As Hite et al (2002) suggested that farmers 
have propensity not to believe their existing production practices contribute to a water pollution 
problem. Therefore, the education through school or through contact with extension agents 
becomes crucial factors determining the level of WTP value. Education is measured in three 
categorical variables (high school or lower, college, and graduate degree) represented by two 
dummy variables in the regression model.  
In addition the farmers who have visited extension agents and talked about farmer’s 
contribution to water pollution are more likely to contribute to water pollution control measures. 
Exposition of individual producers to the extension services is believed to generate awareness 
about ongoing nutrient pollution issues in the local areas. The variable is assumed to have 
positive effect on WTP value. Contact with extension agents was constructed using the 
information obtained indicating whether an individual has visited the extension agents in last 
year. The variable is then used as proxy for his/her general contact with the extension service 
providers.  
The respondents were also asked about their perception regarding the necessity of water 
pollution control measures or regulations. Individuals’ responses are recorded using a Likert 
scale, where five represents an individual strongly agrees with the statement “water pollution 
control measures and regulation are badly needed”. Brox et al. (2003) also measured the 
perception about existing water quality on a WTP study using the Likert scale and treated as a 
continuous variable. The perception about existing water quality significantly increased the 
willingness to pay on their study. Similarly, the broiler producers who believed the water 
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pollution control measures and regulations are badly needed are assumed to state higher WTP 
value.  
Farmers’ off-farm income represents whether the principal operator (owner) of a broiler 
farm has income from other jobs except from broiler production. The individuals who have off-
farm income are not constrained to remain on the business by paying an extra amount for water 
pollution control. Therefore, the individuals with off-farm income are believed to pay a lower 
amount as compared to the ones who solely depend on broiler production to generate household 
income.  Gillespie et al. (2007) finds the farmers with off-farm income are less responsive to 
water pollution control measures.  
Land available to litter application represents the total acreage available to spread the 
broiler litter on individual’s land. Smaller area to litter application implies higher nutrient 
concentration and runoff to the surface water or transportation litter. In order to avoid a fear of 
governmental regulations and the problems associated with litter transportation; these producers 
are likely to pay more in the form of pollution abatement tax. Therefore the variable is assumed 
to be negatively related to the WTP amount. 
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Producer’s WTP function is estimated using ordered probit and interval regression 
approaches. A summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in table 5.1. 
Nearly 69 percent of the farmers hold only a high school degree. About 24 percent were college 
degree holders and only 7% of the broiler producers have graduate level education. Similarly, 
about 32% of the broiler farmers had off farm income. More than 60% of the farmers had contact 
with extension agents in previous year. On an average, 46% of the total land is used to spread 
broiler litter.  
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Table 5. 1: Summary statistics for the variables used  
Variables  Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
High school degree =1 0.689 0.466 0 1 
College degree =1 0.243 0.432 0 1 
Graduate degree =1 0.068 0.253 0 1 
Individual has off farm income =1 0.324 0.471 0 1 
Age of farmer at the time of survey 53.284 12.184 25 79 
Percentage of total land, where litter is usually applied 0.460 0.489 0 3.125 
Individual has contact with extension agents 0.608 0.492 0 1 
Perception that "Water pollution control measure is badly 
needed" in the scale of 1-5 3.775 1.124 1 5 
Table 5.2 presents the estimated coefficients and their standard errors obtained from 
maximizing the two equations at 5.9 and 5.11. The model significance and the R square values 
are also presented at the end of table 5.2. Table 5.3 presents the marginal effects along with their 
standard errors. The ordered probit model is significant at 0.069 percent. Socioeconomic or the 
demographic variables such as age, education, and incomes are included in the model in order to 
capture the variability in individual-specific characteristics.  
Most of the demographic variables are significant with expected signs, while the 
perception of an individual regarding the water quality regulations shows no effect on WTP 
amount. The perception about existing water quality showed no significant effect on willingness 
to pay to improve minor water quality problems in a study conducted by Brox, et al. (2003). 
However, the same study showed a significant effect of the perception on WTP value, while the 
proposed policy addressed major water quality problems. 
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14
 Due to small sample and significant number of missing observation in each category j, the model became 
inestimable when “Respondent’s income” was allowed in the model. 
Table 5.2: Parameter estimates using ordered response models on stated WTP range14 
 
Independent Variables 
Ordered probit  Interval regression  
Coefficients Coefficients 
College degree = 1 1.024** 98.228** 
 (0.455) (43.829) 
Graduate degree = 1 1.248** 133.624** 
 (0.518) (58.375) 
Individual has off farm income =1 -1.005** -90.939*** 
 (0.500) (36.179) 
Age of farmer at the time of survey 0.043** 3.484** 
 (0.020) (1.451) 
Percentage of total land, where litter is usually applied -0.771 -53.945* 
 (0.553) (30.455) 
Individual has contact with extension agents 0.231 18.124 
 (0.363) (35.654) 
Perception that "Water pollution control measures are 
badly needed" scale of 1-5 -0.075 -0.921 
 (0.149) (16.073) 
constant    86.943 
    (115.019) 
q/  2.443   
 (1.323)   
q0 3.816   
  (1.329)   
Number of observations 59 59 
Pseudo R square 0.217 0.203  
Prob. > F  0.069 0.0001 
Note:     * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
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The insignificant effect of water quality perception and the need of regulation originate 
from the fact that the agricultural producers fail to realize their production practices contribute 
enough to cause a water pollution problem (Hite et al. 2002). Thus, the producers’ WTP value 
may not be affected by the perception of water quality if the producers perceive water quality 
problems as minor (Brox, et al., 2003).  
It is assumed that farmers with higher education are knowledgeable about the negative 
impact of water pollution on human health as well as on the natural ecosystem (Urama and 
Dodge, 2006). Therefore, the educated producers are more responsive to water pollution control 
measures. As expected the result indicated the individuals with higher education tend to pay 
greater amounts for water pollution control measures as compared with individuals having less 
than a high-school degree. Both dummy variables for education; the college degree and graduate 
degree, are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance.  
The marginal effects (table 5.3) of education levels show a negative effect on the first 
level of WTP, while it is positive for higher WTP values (level 2 and 3). Thus, the individuals 
who hold either a college or higher degree are willing to pay more for water control measures 
than those with only a high-school degree at most. For individuals with graduate degree, the 
probability of paying <300 decreases by 0.465, however, probability of paying $300-500 and 
>$500 increases by 0.285 and 0.180 respectively (However, the variable is significant at 0.16 for 
WTP value >$500).  
Individual farmers who have off-farm income significantly increases the probability of 
paying less dollars (<$300) for pollution control measures. At the same time, having off-farm 
income decreases the probability of paying higher WTP. The result showed that the probability 
of choosing WTP less than $300 is 0.280 greater for individuals with off-farm income as 
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compared to the ones without off-farm income. In contrary, the probability of stating WTP in 
between $300 and $500 is 0.239 lower for individuals with off-farm income as compared to the 
ones without the off-farm income. 
Note:     * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
Age is an important variable contributing toward WTP decision (Brox, et al., 2003). Age 
is positively associated with the likelihood of environmentally friendly management practices 
(Gillespie et al., 2007). At the same time, it is also found that the older individuals tend to spend 
less on water pollution control measures (Brox, et al., 2003). The result of this study showed age 
is significantly and negatively associated with the choice of less than $300 as their WTP value. 
However, the probability of paying a larger amount (WTP in between $300 and $500) for water 
Table 5.3: Marginal effects of ordered probit models on stated WTP ranges 
Variables 
Marginal Effects 
Mean 
P(WTP=1) P(WTP=2) P(WTP=3) 
College degree =1 -0.366** 0.271** 0.095 0.254 
  (0.155) (0.117) (0.068) 
 
Graduate degree =1 -0.465*** 0.285*** 0.180 0.068 
 
(0.176) (0.104) (0.124) 
 
Individual has off farm income =1 0.280*** -0.239*** -0.041 0.305 
 
(0.102) (0.096) (0.027) 
 
Age of farmer at the time of survey -0.014** 0.012*** 0.002 52.966 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
 
Percentage of total land, where litter is 
usually applied 0.251 -0.210 -0.041 0.464 
 
(0.169) (0.151) (0.033) 
 
Individual has contact with extension agents -0.074 0.062 0.012 0.627 
  (0.115) (0.096) (0.020) 
 
Perception that "Water pollution is badly 
needed" in the scale of 1-5 0.024 -0.020 -0.004 3.746 
  (0.049) (0.042) (0.008)   
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quality control measure increases with age. A ten year increase in respondent’s age increases the 
probability of paying in between $300 and $500 by 0.12 and decreases the probability of paying 
less than $300 by 0.14. Thus, older individuals are willing to spend more on water quality 
control measures, similar to the finding of Gillespie et al. (2007). The result showed individuals 
who have contacted the extension agent in the past year tend to pay more for water pollution 
control measures. However, the estimated parameter is not statistically significant.   
As the WTP value on data represented an interval where the true WTP falls, an interval 
regression was also employed (Whitehead, et al. 2001). The interval regression is similar to the 
ordered logit model when the threshold values are known to the researchers. The conclusion 
using interval regression is not different from that using the ordered probit model. All the 
variables significant on the ordered probit model are also significant on interval regression 
model. Additionally, the parameters have the same signs in both models. 
The effects of variables are interpreted as in case of ordinary regression. An individual 
with a graduate degree pays about $98 more than the counterpart with only high-school degree. 
Similarly, one year older broiler producers pay $3.48 more to control nutrient pollution control 
measure.   
Employing the ordered logit model for WTP, the threshold parameters are not allowed to 
vary depending on the respondent’s farm as well as individual characteristics. Effectively, 
separate equations are run for each of the WTP categories with the assumption that the slope 
parameters are same among the equations but not the intercepts. With this parallel regression 
assumption, the estimated coefficients are similar in each equation.  
However, the assumption may not be unrealistic if the stated WTP varies based on the 
explanatory variables. The estimated parameters may lead to incorrect, incomplete and 
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misleading results (Williams, 2006). A Wald test for the parallel regression assumption is used in 
order to examine whether the slope coefficients differ for each category of stated WTP.  
Table 5.4: Coefficient estimates using generalized ordered probit model 
 Variables 
  
Coefficients Coefficients 
P(WTP=1) P(WTP=2) 
College degree =1 1.087** 1.087** 
 (0.478) (0.478) 
Graduate degree 1.440*** 1.440*** 
 (0.522) (0.522) 
Individual has off farm income =1 -0.949* -0.949** 
 (0.530) (0.530) 
Age of farmer at the time of survey 0.035* 0.035** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Percentage of total land, where litter is 
usually applied -0.933* -0.933* 
 (0.576) (0.576) 
Individual has contact with extension agents 0.106 0.106 
 (0.379) (0.379) 
Perception that "Water pollution is badly 
needed" in the scale of 1-5 -0.199 0.960* 
 (0.163) (0.570) 
constant  -1.492 -7.844*** 
  (1.375) (2.762) 
Number of observations 59  
Pseudo R square 0.28  
Wald w0 (Prob. > w0) 18.66(0.016)  
Note:     * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
The Wald test statistics (Chi square with 6 df = 19.57) was significant indicating 
violation of the parallel regression assumption. Further analysis detected that the perception 
about the need for environmental regulation violated the assumption. Therefore, a generalized 
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ordered probit model is employed to relax the parallel regression assumption only for the 
perception variable. The estimated coefficients and their standard errors obtained generalized 
ordered logit are presented in Table 5.4.  
Now, the perception variable is allowed to have different effects on different categories 
of stated WTP values. The result showed that individuals’ perception significantly and positively 
affected the likelihood of paying higher amounts ($300 to $500) for water pollution control and 
decreased the probability of paying less (< $300). However, the effect of the perception is not 
statistically significant for the WTP category < $700 
Table 5.5: Marginal effects estimated from the generalized ordered probit model 
Variables  
Marginal Effects 
P(WTP=1) P(WTP =2) P(WTP =3) 
College degree =1 -0.386*** 0.356*** 0.030 
(0.160) (0.140) (0.048) 
Graduate degree -0.528*** 0.438*** 0.090 
(0.163) (0.154) (0.098) 
Individual has off farm income =1 0.263*** -0.255** -0.008 
(0.109) (0.109) (0.013) 
Age of farmer at the time of survey -0.011* 0.011* 0.000 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) 
Percentage of total land, where litter is usually 
applied 0.301* -0.290* -0.011 
(0.172) (0.170) (0.018) 
Individual has contact with extension agents -0.034 0.033 0.001 
(0.120) (0.116) (0.005) 
Perception that "Water pollution is badly needed" 
in the scale of 1-5 0.064 -0.075 0.011 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.014) 
Note: * , **  and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
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In addition, the generalized ordered probit model showed the portion of land available for 
litter spreading significantly affects the WTP value (the variable was not significant with ordered 
probit specification). So, having a larger portion of land to spread broiler litter increases the 
likelihood of a paying less for pollution abatement and decreases the probability of choosing to 
pay higher amount ($300 to $500). The farmers spread broiler litter as fertilizer for crops 
production, the crops demand for fertilizer may utilize a larger portion of poultry litter (if not all 
produced by broiler production practices) and therefore less pollution runoff. The individuals 
with a larger portion of land available for litter application believe the pollution runoff should 
not be a problem  for their land. Thus, their production practices doesn’t contribute enough 
nutrient pollution to pollute the nearby water sources. Therefore, these farmers are less likely to 
pay a larger amount for water quality control measures.  
The mean WTP value was calculated using the parameter estimates from the interval 
regression model. The estimated average WTP value that a broiler producer would like to pay in 
order to control water pollution is $260.955.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The broiler production is operated by farmers where the integrators provide chicks and 
feed to the producers and the producers raise chicks to marketable weight. The farmers are paid 
based on performance which depends on production efficiency and the integrators take the 
responsibility of marketing final product. However, none of the beneficiaries takes the 
responsibility of litter management to reduce excess nutrient flow. Such fact forces the 
government to regulate the broiler production in order to reduce the inverse effect of meat 
production on environment. In fact the broiler production is under a threat of stringent 
government regulation (MacDonald, 2008) which, Segerson and Miceli (1998) believe, is 
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important to protect the environmental quality. Therefore, the concept of punishing/charging 
CAFOs and AFO if it fails to meet the desired level of pollution abatement efforts seems 
important to mitigate nutrient pollution contributed by broiler producers. 
 The question of “how much” and “what should be considered” before setting up a 
standard payment level, remains vague. In this study, I evaluated the concept of providing 
negative incentives for polluters to enforce pollution control efforts on their production decision. 
A contingent valuation approach is employed to examine the affordability (or willingness to 
spend on water pollution control measures) of the farmers based on socioeconomic as well as 
farm level information. Result indicated that the broiler producers are willing to pay about $260 
per flock per year as pollution abatement cost. This compares to almost 20% of their net profit 
from broiler production per flock in Louisiana. 
The value will be useful at the policy level to understand the amount that a farmer is 
willing to pay/bear for pollution control measures above which an incentive level can be fixed to 
enforce environmentally friendly production practices. This will reduce the adverse effect of 
higher incentive payment on production practices. For example, larger incentive payments 
provided to help reduce pollution may divert producers’ interest from production toward 
receiving subsidy. This will also reduce the government expenditure on incentive payments. 
Thus, the policy instruments such as a pollution abatement tax that are levied beyond the 
farmers, WTP value may reduce cost to the government and unintended effect of incentive 
payment on production decision.  
One drawback in this study is the failure of the ordered logit model to estimate the dollar 
amount that an individual can afford to reduce the negative impact of his/her production 
practices. The returned survey did not produce enough observations to use an individual’s dollar 
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value of WTP. Therefore, WTP value is measured using intervals where the individual’s true 
values may fall. As this study is based on farmers’ value of the better environment, lack of 
complete information about the negative effects of pollution on the health and ecosystem and 
enough knowledge about the proposed tax policy may have resulted into failing to provide the 
exact amount of WTP value. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The large volume of litter produced by confined broiler production forces excessive use 
of broiler litter on available crop and pasture land producing adverse effects on human as well as 
the ecosystem. The negative economic incentives associated with litter transportation and litter 
management forces broiler producers to intensify the repetitive application exacerbating the 
nutrient accumulation and runoff.  
The broiler producers in Louisiana fail to accommodate pollution reduction effort on their 
production decision mainly due to the byproduct nature of pollution production and externality 
nature of water pollution. In addition, the producers fail to realize their production process 
contributes enough nutrient pollution to nearby water-bodies. The producers thus, hesitate to 
contribute toward the pollution control programs (Hite, et al. 2002; Poe et al., 2003). Thus, the 
issue of how to best manage agricultural nutrient runoff becomes an important concern mainly 
among policy makers.  
Economists advocate the economic tool is the most cost effective approach to mitigate 
the harmful effects of nonpoint source pollution (Freeman, 2003). Accordingly, my dissertation 
evaluated economic aspects of three litter management options to reduce nutrient pollution 
originated from broiler productions. Lyon and Maxwell (2002) support the presumption that 
voluntary adoption of environmentally friendly production practices is socially beneficial as 
compared to others. However, the adoptions of such practices (BMP) have been very slow, 
questioning the effectiveness of the voluntary effort to mitigate water pollution.  
The first chapter of this dissertation evaluated the factors contributing to the slow 
diffusion of the voluntarily adopted BMPs. It is true that the adoption of a single BMP may 
suffice to reduce water pollution and may not require another approach for some farms. For 
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others, using a BMP may not reduce pollution production to desired levels and require other 
practices to be adopted as the complements. An implementation of a second practice thus 
depends on the characteristics of previously adopted practices and level of pollution reduction 
from the first one. These characteristics of BMP adoptions require an in-depth understanding of 
the effect of previously adopted practices before intending to adopt another one. The result of 
this study also supports the argument by showing an existence of dependence among multiple 
BMP adoptions.   
On evaluating the factors supporting/hindering the adoption of BMPs, this study found a 
significant correlation among the multiple BMPs adopted by an individual. Therefore the 
conditional frailty model that allows for such correlation is employed to obtain consistent and 
efficient parameter estimates in the presence of event dependence and shared individual 
characteristics. The result from first chapter showed a presence of individual level heterogeneity 
and /or correlation among multiple BMP adoptions.  The larger variance of the random effect 
parameter either originated from event dependence or individual specific characteristics shared 
among the adoptions by an individual producer. Therefore, the study also implies that a deep 
understanding of how the adoption of a BMP affects the adoption of another BMP while 
designing policy tools and strategies to encourage voluntary/mandatory BMP adoptions. 
The adoption of BMPs in Louisiana shows an initial stage of “S” shaped pattern of 
technology adoption where the number of adoption significantly increased after the year 1992. 
As the theory of technology transfer suggests, the rate of BMP adoption increased once the 
producers became more informative about the BMPs, either through neighbors, extension 
educations or through the advertisement. The result supports the argument showing that the more 
informed farmers, through school education and/or contact with extension agents, adopt BMPs 
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faster than their counterparts. Thus, farmers’ education through extension services and the 
programs such as master farmer programs become important factors to be considered in order to 
increase the rate of BMP adoptions. 
At the same time, the existing studies claim that the voluntary practices are effective only 
if implemented as complementary to other pollution reduction approaches such as environmental 
regulation or standards. This requires a search for other alternative pollution reduction 
mechanisms in order to obtain desired level of pollution reduction. In this regards, this 
dissertation evaluated two other economic tools to enforce broiler producers to participate on the 
pollution reduction goals. The fourth and fifth chapter evaluated the factors associated with 
farmers’ desire to participate in pollution reduction programs.  
The forth chapter focused on whether the broiler producers are willing to participate on 
production termination program to mitigate water pollution and what would be the incentive 
level that suffices to encourage farmers to participate in the programs. It assumes that the 
nutrient pollution can be reduced through terminating broiler production either full or partially. 
From the policy perspective, it provides an insight over the factors to be considered before 
setting up incentive payments that encourage broiler producers to cooperate with pollution 
reduction goal.  
This study finds that the size of the farm, significantly affects the size of incentive 
payment, represented by the willingness to accept (WTA) value, desired by the broiler producers. 
The larger farmers are more serious about water pollution and potential regulations and thus state 
a lower WTA values to help reduce water pollution. Larger farmers are also found to be early 
adopters of BMPs and are willing to participate on production termination programs. This 
implies that the larger farmers are willing to cooperate with pollution reduction program. Larger 
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farmer are more responsive to water pollution regulation may be due to the fact that the CAFO 
and AFO regulations are harsh on the large farms and therefore, farmers like to avoid the 
consequence of dealing with the harsh environmental/governmental regulations. 
On the other hand, the significant positive effect of perception that government should 
pay farmers to participate in pollution abatement programs suggested that a sufficient economic 
incentive is required to encourage farmers to participate in environmentally friendly production 
practices. Individuals with larger crop and pasture land to spread litter are less likely to terminate 
the production. In addition the analysis of willingness to pay study in chapter five showed that 
the individuals with larger crop and pasture land are willing to pay less for pollution control 
effort.  Therefore, for these individuals, adopting BMP may become the low cost pollution 
control option.  
Further, contact with extension agents and education are found to have positive effect on 
cooperating with the pollution reduction programs. Chapter three shows contact with extension 
agents increases the likelihood of adopting BMPs earlier than their counterpart; chapter five 
showed these individuals pay more dollars to improve water quality. The chapter four showed 
individual who know about the alternative approaches of pollution reduction are less likely to 
terminate the broiler production. This result suggests that the farmers are reluctant to terminate 
the production if alternative approaches are available. Chapter three that the farmers near to the 
age of retirement are hesitant to adopt BMPs. However, the older farmers are likely to pay more 
for water pollution control measures. Thus, the study implies that policy tools that require 
farmers to pay for pollution reduction are more effective with the older farmers. 
Chapter four and five will be novel in the area of environmental economics in the sense 
that it incorporates the farmers’ attitude toward nutrient pollution reduction programs. 
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Establishing the appropriate baseline incentive payment based on the farmers’ anticipated 
amount to receive and pay to mitigate water pollution avoids the unintended negative 
consequences of governmental incentive payments. The estimated WTP and WTA values will 
serve as add-on to setting up incentive payments either as direct subsidy for producer to reduce 
the litter production through curtailing the broiler production or through paying pollution 
abatement cost. In addition, the incentive payments can also be established to enhance the BMP 
adoptions. Thus, the second section of this dissertation carries more weight when it comes to 
policy implication on setting up the incentive levels to encourage pollution reduction efforts. 
These chapters are important because very little is known about the broiler producers’ attitude 
and willingness to participate in the pollution reduction programs. And the understandings of the 
factors that affect farmer’s interest to participate in those programs are critical for the success of 
national and state level policy formulation in order to mitigate water pollution.    
The third chapter will be novel in the area of BMP adoption as it allows the correlation 
among the multiple adoptions while evaluating the dissemination of pollution abatement best 
management practices. In fact, the adoptions of multiple BMPs are common in practice and the 
adoptions are interconnected with one another and tools that accounts for the interconnection 
among BMPs should be employed to examine the diffusion process of BMP to reduce nutrient 
pollution. The analytical process carries more weight because the process can be replicated to 
examine any kind of technology adoption to improve the profit level of farming operations. 
This study does not provide insight into the magnitude of pollution reduction through the 
implementation of BMPs or through production termination. The questions such as how much 
pollution can be reduced by implementing a specific BMP is not addressed in this dissertation. 
Also, the question of how many flocks should be cut off to achieve desired level of water quality 
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is determined by the target water quality requirement in a given watershed, which is beyond the 
scope of this study.  While using the estimated value of WTA representing incentive that the 
farmers need, one should be cautious about unintended effects of larger incentive on production 
termination. Examining the amount that the individuals are willing to pay (WTP) for reducing 
water pollution, this study suggests that the incentive payments can be established beyond the 
WTP. Doing so reduces the cost of pollution control for the government as well as the 
unintended adverse effect of larger incentive payments to the society and the environments.  
The main shortcoming of this dissertation is the limited number of observation. Since the 
data was provided for the analysis, improving the response rate or the number of observation 
become outside the scope of this study. It should also be noticed that the standard errors of the 
estimated parameters are based on the small sample therefore, one should be cautious about the 
interpretation of the exact estimates. However, the methodology applied in this dissertation is 
well suited and can be applied in the similar studies in other fields.  
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APPENDIX A: TREND IN MEAT CONSUMPTION 
 
Figure A1: Trend in Meat Consumption Over Ninety Five years 
Data Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodConsumption/spreadsheets 
/mtpcc.xls#carcass!a1 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
1909 1915 1921 1927 1933 1939 1945 1951 1957 1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999 2005
Chicken Beef Pork Lamb Veal
Trends  in Meat Consumption 
124 
 
APPENDIX B: PROPORTIONAL HAZARD RESIDUAL PLOTS AND TESTS 
The probability of chi-square value is larger than 0.05 which implies that the proportional 
hazard assumption holds for each variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B1: Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
Variables      rho chi2 Prob>chi2 
Broiler numbers 0.18352 1.53 0.2154 
Experience 0.35913 5.93 0.0149 
Education -0.11799 0.57 0.4494 
Age 0.09061 0.28 0.5973 
Farm income 0.24339 1.92 0.166 
Contd. after 
retirement 
-0.09532 0.53 0.4685 
Ownership 0.19337 1.05 0.3057 
Policy -0.08272 0.3 0.5826 
Contact with 
extension agents 
-0.02069 0.02 0.9019 
Global test 13.34 0.1478 
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The scaled schoenfeld residual are plotted to examine the assumption of Cox proportional 
hazard model. Few of them are listed on the following figure. 
             
           
 
Figure B1: Residuals plots to check the whether the proportional hazard assumption hold 
for each variable used in the model. 
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Figure B2: Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard function for BMP adoption differentiated by 
type of available BMPs 
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Figure B3: Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard function for first BMP adoption for an 
individual 
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Figure B4: Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard function for second BMP adoption for an 
individual 
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Covariance Structure of Variance Corrected Models 
The variance correction model are based on the following setting of covariance matrix: The 
variance corrected models are based on robust standard errors which accounts for 
interdependence across repeated or heterogeneous events. The regular variance-covariance 
matrix is obtained by: 
P 	  ÁÂ0T=Â50 Ã 
The robust standard error is; 
PÄjÅ 	 P Æ(`LM/ (PÈ 
And the cluster corrected standard error to allow for the heterogeneity can be stated as; 
PÉ}jÅÊÄ 	 P Æ ËÌÆ (OLEM/ Í
` ÌÆ (OLEM/ ÍÎ
Ï
OM/ PÈ 
Where V is number of clusters. ( is the contribution of individual  to the score function 
¸}LÐ¸Y  evaluated at 5.  
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Table B.2: Data setting for conditional frailty model 
Serial no event Adoption yr start end duration1  Event no broilerno1 year Experience  age 
1 1 2000 0 46 46 1 500 15 5 25 
1 0 2004 46 50 4 2 500 15 5 25 
2 1 1998 0 14 14 1 600 20 20 50 
2 0 2004 14 20 6 2 600 20 20 50 
3 1 1994 0 15 15 1 384 10 25 64 
3 0 2004 15 25 10 2 384 10 25 64 
4 1 2002 0 2 2 1 750 12 4 52 
4 0 2004 2 4 2 2 750 12 4 52 
5 1 2003 0 2.5 2.5 1 500 30 14 48 
5 0 2004 2.5 3.5 1 2 500 30 14 48 
6 0 2004 0 4 4 1 657.6 35 4 42 
7 0 2004 0 24 24 1 284.8 5 24 61 
8 0 2004 0 30 30 1 240 0 30 63 
9 0 2004 0 24 24 1 550 10 35 53 
10 1 1996 0 2 2 1 595 0 10 64 
10 0 2004 2 8 6 2 595 0 10 64 
11 0 2004 0 6 6 1 800 25 9 32 
12 1 1995 0 3 3 1 880 0 12 79 
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APPENDIX C: HECKMANS SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL USIGN TWO-STEP 
PROCEDURE AND RESULT 
Two-step Estimator 
 Conditional expected value of   given  	 1 is; 
 | 	 1 	 ~7 $ ~7R, 
 ! 	 ¦!/Φ!,        
Where ! is a real number ranging over ∞, ∞ and ¦ and Φ represents the density and 
distribution functions of the standard normal distribution, respectively. The expected value of 
WTA, for an individual , is now expressed as follows, given that  	 1; 
 | 	 1 	 ~7 $ D~7RF $   (4.9) 
The Heckman’s two-step estimator is obtained based on equation 4.9. At the first stage, the  
probit maximum likelihood approach is employed to estimate consistent estimates of 7. The 7 
is replaced by estimated maximum likelihood estimator 7R. Then ordinary least square approach 
is used to estimate 7. 
At the first step, the model endogenizes the respondents’ participation decision to 
estimate the probability of selection (participation). Then, at the second step, the estimated 
probability (through mills ratio or cdf and pdf of the participation decision) is used while 
estimating the expected value of WTA.  
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Table C1: The determinants of willingness to participate: binary variable §¨ 
(Two step) 
WTA seen Coef. Std. Err. 
Number of broilers/100000 0.171 0.106 
Individual has off-farm income =1 -1.290 0.576 
Percentage of land owned by the grower -0.066 0.029 
Ownership of business; individual owner=1 -1.079 0.622 
Perception that government should pay for water 
conservation in the scale of 1-5 -0.559 0.249 
If there are housing subdivisions in nearby =1 0.222 1.233 
Age of farmer at the time of survey -0.086 0.035 
Heard about BMP 1.381 0.616 
Constant 0.171 0.106 
Wald chi2(8)       47.91 
Prob > chi2       0.000   
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Table C2:The determinants of WTA: The sample selection model for ª¨ (Two step) 
 Variables Coefficients Std. Errors 
Number of broilers/100000 -241.124 133.348 
Individual has off-farm income =1 2515.122 911.290 
Perception that government should pay for water 
conservation in the scale of 1-5 973.166 314.715 
If there are housing subdivisions in nearby =1 562.233 1265.308 
Ownership of business; individual owner=1 1453.298 851.696 
Heard about BMP 2080.730 1067.652 
Age of farmer at the time of survey -32.350 36.402 
Farm income up to 49,999 3576.696 1372.426 
Farm income up to 50,000 to 99,999 1876.217 1418.725 
Farm income greater than 99,999 2814.687 1453.112 
Constant -2260.043 2928.690 
  2623.107 1440.103 
  0.958 
   2738.576 
Pseudo R-square 0.419 
No of obs. 70 
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Table C3: Regression of estimated inverse mills ratio to examine correlation 
 
Variables  Coefficients 
 
Std. Errors  
Number of broilers/100000 
-0.040** 0.0157 
Individual has off-farm income =1 
0.364*** 0.097 
Perception that government should pay for 
water conservation in the scale of 1-5 
0.121*** 0.035 
If there are housing subdivision in nearby 
=1 
0.156** 0.149 
Ownership of business; individual owner=1 
0.229 0.101 
Heard about BMP 
-0.174 0.121 
Age of farmer at the time of survey 
0.017*** 0.004 
Farm income up to 49,999 
0.0428 0.175 
Farm income up to 50,000 to 99,999 
0.028 0.170 
Farm income greater than 99,999 
0.124 0.177 
Constant 
-1.039*** 0.346 
R-squared 0.433 
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Table C4: Correlation table with inverse mills ratio 
 
     mill bn off_inc govt_pay housing owner bmp age inc50K inc100K inc more
mill 1.00
          bn -0.21 1.00
         Off_inc 0.22 0.04 1.00
        gov_pay 0.15 0.22 -0.12 1.00
       housing -0.01 0.11 -0.01 -0.11 1.00
      owner 0.16 0.05 -0.16 0.20 0.10 1.00
     bmp -0.22 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.02 1.00
    age 0.32 -0.10 -0.12 -0.34 -0.10 -0.15 -0.23 1.00
   Inc50K 0.11 -0.16 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.09 -0.37 0.16 1.00
  Inc100K -0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.14 0.24 0.05 -0.50 1.00
 Inc more 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.13 0.19 -0.85 -0.36 -0.42 1.00
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APPENDIX D: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES USED 
Table D1: Distribution of dependent variable  
 WTP categories Freq. Percent Cum. 
WTP < 300 43 69.35 69.35 
300< WTP < 500 15 24.19 93.55 
500< WTP < 700 4 6.45 100 
 Total 62 100   
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Table D2: Education attained by respondents 
Education level Freq. Percent Cum. 
Less than high school 51 68.92 68.92 
College 18 24.32 93.24 
Graduate 5 6.76 100 
 Total 74 100   
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APPENDIX E: STATA PPROGRAM 
APPENDIX E1: CODES USED IN CHAPTER THREE 
clear 
set more off 
capture log close 
set logtype text  
 
*log using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 'Agec-
 server1' (Z)\dissertation1\Adoption\analysis\stata\result_June4th.doc", 
 replace 
 
insheet using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 
 'Agec-server1' (Z)\dissertation1\Adoption\analysis\stata\ 
 data_stata3.txt" 
 
***  RUN THIS ONLY TO GET GRAPH OF ADOPTION OVER TIME 
 *keep if event ==1 
 *sort adoptionyr 
 *gen n=_n 
 *keep serialno adoptionyr n 
 *graph twoway line  n adoptionyr  
 
 
*** HOUSING  ********* 
 replace q43_housing=. if q43_housing>1 
 
*** POLICY *********  
 gen policy1996=0  
 replace policy1996=1 if adoptionyr>1996 
 replace policy1996=. if  adoptionyr==. 
 
*** EDUCATION ********** 
 *list q43_educ if q43_educ==0 
 
 gen educ1=0 if q43_educ==1 
 replace educ1=0 if q43_educ==2 
 replace educ1=0 if q43_educ==3 
 replace educ1=1 if q43_educ==6 
 replace educ1=1 if q43_educ==4  
 replace educ1=0 if q43_educ==5 
 
 replace educ1=. if q43_educ==0 
 replace educ1=. if q43_educ==. 
 
*** AGE ********** 
 *list q43_age if q43_age==0 
 replace q43_age=. if q43_age==0 
 replace q43_age=25 if q43_age==2.5 
 replace q43_age=. if q43_age==. 
 
*** OWNERSHIP ********** 
 *list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==5 
 *list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==4 
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 gen q43_ownership1=1 if q43_ownership==0 
 replace q43_ownership1=1 if q43_ownership==1 
 replace q43_ownership1=1 if q43_ownership==2 
 replace q43_ownership1=2 if q43_ownership==3 
 replace q43_ownership=. if q43_ownership==5 
 replace q43_ownership=. if q43_ownership==4 
 replace q43_ownership=. if q43_ownership==. 
 
*** MARITAL ********** 
 list q43_marital if q43_marital==0 
 
 gen q43_marital1=1 if q43_marital==3 
 replace q43_marital1=0 if q43_marital != 3 
 replace q43_marital1=. if q43_marital==0  
 replace q43_marital1=. if q43_marital==.  
 
*** GENDER ********** 
 *list q43_gender if q43_gender==2 
 
 replace q43_gender=. if q43_gender==2 
 
*** RACE ********** 
 list q43_race if q43_race==0  
 gen q43_race1 =1 if q43_race ==4 
 replace q43_race1 =0 if q43_race !=4 
 replace q43_race1 =. if q43_race ==. 
 
*** RETIRE ********** 
 *list q43_retire if q43_retire==1 
 
 gen q43_retire1=1 if q43_retire ==1 
 replace q43_retire1=0 if q43_retire==2 
 replace q43_retire1=0 if q43_retire==3 
 replace q43_retire1=. if q43_retire==0 
 replace q43_retire1=. if q43_retire==. 
 
*** ASSET LIAB ********** 
 *list q43_assetliab if q43_assetliab==6  
 replace q43_assetliab=. if q43_assetliab==0 
 
*** PERCENTAGE OF INCOME FROM BROILER ********** 
 replace q43_perfarminc=. if q43_perfarminc==0 
 
**** FARM INCOME ********** 
*** there no 6 in the category 
 *list q43_farmincome if q43_farmincome==1 
 
 gen q43_farmincome1=0  if q43_farmincome==5 
 replace q43_farmincome1=0 if q43_farmincome==4 
 replace q43_farmincome1=1 if q43_farmincome==3 
 replace q43_farmincome1=1 if q43_farmincome==2 
 replace q43_farmincome1=1 if q43_farmincome==1 
 
 replace q43_farmincome=. if q43_farmincome==0 
 replace q43_farmincome=. if q43_farmincome==. 
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corr q2_broilerno1 q30_bmp q7_litterac q43_exper q43_age  q43_educ 
 q43_gender q43_marital1 q43_race1 q43_farmincome1 q43_retire 
 q43_housing q43_ownership1 q43_assetliab policy1996 
 
 stset duration, failure(event) 
 stsum, by(bmp) 
 
*** NELSON ALLEN CUMMULATIVE HAZARD FUNCTION  
 sts list,na 
 sts graph, na 
 
***  id(serialno) 
 
*** PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
xi: stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1 
 q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact,  efron nolog tvc(q43_age) 
 stcox, nohr 
 
*** CLUSTER CORRECTED MODEL 
xi: stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1 
 q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, efron cluster(serialno) nolog 
 tvc(q43_age) 
 stcox, nohr 
 
*** WLW MODEL 
xi: stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1 
 q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, efron strata(bmp) 
 cluster(serialno) nolog tvc(q43_age) 
 stcox, nohr 
 
*** SHARED FRAILTY MODEL 
xi: stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1 
 q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, frailty(gamma) shared(serialno) 
 efron nolog tvc(q43_age) 
 stcox, nohr 
 
 
*** TESTING ASSUMPTION OF COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD  
xi: stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 q43_age q43_farmincome1 
 q43_retire1 q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact,  efron nolog noshow 
 schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*) 
 
 stphtest, log detail 
 stphtest, log plot(q2_broilerno1 ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q43_exper ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q43_age ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(_Ieduc1_ ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q43_farmincome1 ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q43_retire1 ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q43_ownership1 ) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(policy1996) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q44_contact) yline(0) 
 stphtest, log plot(q43_marital1 ) yline(0) 
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R CODES FOR CONDITIONAL FRAILTY MODEL 
library(survival) 
data<-read.table("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Ashish\\My Documents\\ndevko1$ 
 on 'Agec-server1' (Z)\\dissertation1\\Adoption\\analysis\\R\\data for 
 r21.txt", header = TRUE) 
cond.frailty.gamma<-coxph(formula = Surv(start, end, event) ~ broilerno1 + 
 exper + age + educ1 + farmincome1 + retire1 + ownership1 + policy1996 + 
 contact + strata(eventno) + frailty.gamma(serialno), data = data) 
 beta.cond.f.gamma<- cond.frailty.gamma$coef 
 naivese.cond.f.gamma<- sqrt(diag(cond.frailty.gamma$var)) 
 se.cond.f.gamma<-sqrt(diag(cond.frailty.gamma$var2)) 
 loglike1.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$loglik[[1]] # 
 loglike1.cond.f.gamma 
 loglike2.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$loglik[[2]] #base 
 loglike2.cond.f.gamma 
 theta.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$history[[1]]$theta 
 theta.cond.f.gamma 
 ll.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$history[[1]]$c.loglik 
 ll.cond.f.gamma 
 summary(cond.frailty.gamma) 
 ) 
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APPENDIX E2: CODES USED IN CHAPTER FOUR 
version 10.0 
 
****************************************  
****  HECKMAN 2 STEP PROCEDURE 
****************************************  
 
capture log close 
set more off 
 
insheet using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 
 'Agec-server1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTP\data\ 
 DATA_ORDLOGIT_SAS.txt", clear 
 
log using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 'Agec-
 server1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTA\ 
 result_dec_30th_heckman_final.doc", replace text 
 
****  DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR SELECTION MODEL  ********************** 
 
*** WHO ANSWERED ZERO TO THE WTA QUESTION ARE NON-PARTICIPATOR AND ARE 
 SELECTED OUT FROM THE WTA MODEL.  
 
*** DUE TO OUTLIER THE UPPER END OF WTA IS TRUNCATED AT Q3+*2 INTERQUARTILE 
 RANGE; 
 replace wta=0 if q24_minwta==0 & q24_minwta!=. 
 gen wtaseen=1 if q24_minwta>0  
 replace wta=. if q24_minwta==. 
 replace wtaseen=0 if q24_minwta==0 
 replace wtaseen=0 if q24_minwta==. 
 list wtaseen q24_minwta wta   
 
***  MARITAL STATUS ************************* 
 
*** Q43_MARITAL: 1= SINGLE; 2=DIVORSED; 3=MARRIED; 4=WIDOWED 
*** THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 2 
*** THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDUALS WITH 5 AND THESE ARE CODED AS 0 
***  
 drop married 
 *list q43_marital if q43_marital==5 
 gen married=1 if q43_marital==3  
 replace married = 0 if q43_marital!=3 
 replace married = . if q43_marital==. 
 *list married q43_marital 
 
*** SPOUCE-INCOME ************************** 
***  Q43_SPOUCEINCOME=1 IF SPOUCE HAS INCOME ELSE 0 
*** 
 *list q43_spouceincome if q43_spouceincome==1 
 
**********MARRIED*SPOUCEINCOME********************* 
 
 gen married_sincome=married*q43_spouceincome 
 *list married married_sincome q43_spouceincome 
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********** ASSET LIABILTIY  ******************* 
 
*** Q43_ASSETIAB: 1=NO DEBT; 2=1-20%; 3=21-40%; 4=41-60%; 5=>60% 
*** THERE ARE 4 INDIVIDUALS THAT HAVE 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1 
*** 
 *list q43_assetliab if q43_assetliab==5 
 drop assetliab 
 gen assetliab=1 if q43_assetliab==0|q43_assetliab==1|q43_assetliab==2 
 replace assetliab=0 if 
 q43_assetliab==3|q43_assetliab==4|q43_assetliab==5 
 *list assetliab q43_assetliab 
 
********** OWNERSHIP ************************* 
 
*** Q43_OWNERSHIP: 1=INDIVIDUAL; 2= FAMILY; 3=FATHER-SON; 4=OTHERS 
*** THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 3 
*** THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDALS WITH 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1 
  
 *list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==3 
 gen ownership=1 if q43_ownership==0 
 replace ownership=1 if q43_ownership==1 
 replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==2 
 replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==4 
 replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==3 
 
********* OFF_FARM INCOME  ************** 
 
*** Q43_OFFINCOME: 1= OWNER HAS OFF FARM INCOME TOO 
*** 
 *list q43_offincome if q43_offincome==1 
 
*** Q43_FARMINCOME *************************** 
 
*** Q43_FARMINCOME: 1= >100000 2=50000-99999; 3=0-49999; 4=LOSS <25000; 5= 
 LOSS 25000-50000; 6=LOSS>50000 
*** THERE ARE NO OBS ON 6 
*** 3 AND 4 ARE CHNAGED TO ONE CATEGORY TO MAKE EQUAL INTERVAL 
***  
 *list q43_farmincome if q43_farmincome==6 
  
 gen farm_income =1 if q43_farmincome==4 | q43_farmincome==5                
 replace farm_income =2 if q43_farmincome==3 
 replace farm_income=3 if q43_farmincome==2 
 replace farm_income =4 if q43_farmincome==1 
  
 *list farm_income q43_farmincome 
 
*** Q43_EDUCATION *************************** 
 
*** Q43_EDUC: 1= > H SCHOOL; 2= HIGHSCHOOL; 3=COLLEGE; 4=UNDERGRAD; 
 5=GRADUATE; 6= VOCATIONAL  
*** THERE IS NO OBSERVATION ON 6 
***  
 drop educ 
 *list q43_educ if q43_educ==6 
 gen educ =1 if q43_educ==1 | q43_educ==2 
 replace educ=2 if q43_educ==3 | q43_educ==4 
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 replace educ=3 if q43_educ==5 
 *list q43_educ educ 
 
***  Q43_HOUSING  ************************** 
 *list q43_housing if q43_housing==1 
 
***   Q43_RETIRE  ************************** 
 *list q43_retire if q43_retire==3 
 
***  Q2_BROILERNO ************************** 
*** NUMBER OF BROIER IN 100,000 
*** 
 gen bn=q2_broilerno/100000 
 
***  Q43_PERS ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS ********** 
*** pay = Q43_PERS11-15= GOVT SHOULD PAY FARMERS FOR WATER CONSERVATION 
 PRACTICES 5=STONGLY AGREEE 
*** Q43_PERS16-20 = GOVT SHULDNOT BE INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURE 5=STONGLY 
 AGREEE 
*** Q43_PERS21-25 = GOVT INVOLVED IN AG HELPS FARMERS 5=STONGLY AGREEE 
*** THERE IS ONE OBS WITH GOVT_PAY==6 THAT IS CHAGNED T0 5 
 
 egen govt_pay = rowtotal(q43_pers11-q43_pers15) 
 replace govt_pay=5 if govt_pay==6 
 replace govt_pay =. if govt_pay==0 
 egen govt_inv=rowtotal(q43_pers16-q43_pers20) 
 replace govt_inv =. if govt_inv==0 
 egen govt_ag = rowtotal(q43_pers21-q43_pers25) 
 replace govt_ag=. if govt_ag==0 
 
************************************************* 
*** CORRELATION CHECK  
xi: corr wta wtaseen bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership 
 q30_bmp q43_age i.farm_income per_own ownership 
 
*** VARIABLE SELECTION FOR WTASEEN FROM STEPWISE PROBIT  
 ******************************************** 
   
xi: stepwise, pr(.30): probit wtaseen bn educ per_own per_littuse ownership 
 q30_bmp assetliab q43_age q43_firmage q43_offincome q43_housing 
 q44_contact q41_year q43_exper q40_plantosp govt_pay 
 
*** SELECTED VARIABLES FOR WTASEEN FROM STEPWISE PROBIT  
 *bn q43_offincome per_own ownership  govt_pay q43_age q30_bmp 
 
*** VARIABLE SELECTION FOR WTA FROM STEPWISE REGRESSION   
  
xi :stepwise, pr(.30): reg wta bn educ per_own per_littuse ownership 
 q30_bmp assetliab q43_age q43_firmage q43_offincome q43_housing 
 q44_contact q41_year q43_exper q40_plantosp govt_pay i.farm_income  
 
*** SELECTIED VARIABLES FOR WTA FROM STEPWISE REGRESSION   
 *bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age 
 i.farm_income  
  
sum  wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age 
 farm_income  
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*** HECKMAN'S SELECTION MODEL  
 
***  SUMMARY STATISTICS  ********************** 
xi:  sum wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp 
 q43_age i.farm_income wtaseen per_own q41_year 
xi:  corr mill bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp 
 q43_age i.farm_income 
  
***  HECKMAN MODEL SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL (TWO STEP)  
xi:  heckman wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp 
 q43_age i.farm_income, select(wtaseen =bn  q43_offincome per_own 
 ownership govt_pay q43_housing q43_age q30_bmp) first twostep 
 mills(mill) 
 predict ycond, ycond 
 sum ycond 
xi:  reg mill bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp 
 q43_age i.farm_income 
 vif 
 
***  HECKMAN SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL (MLE) 
xi:  heckman wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp 
 q43_age i.farm_income, select(wtaseen =bn q43_offincome per_own 
 ownership govt_pay q43_housing q43_age q30_bmp) first   
 predict ycond1, ycond 
 sum ycond1 
xi:  reg wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age 
 i.farm_income, robust    
 predict xb 
 sum xb 
 
***  OLS of wta 
 
xi:  reg wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age 
 i.farm_income, robust   
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APPENDIX E3: CODES USED IN CHAPTER FIVE 
 version 10.0 
 set more off 
 clear 
 capture log close 
insheet using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 
 'Agec-server1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTP\data\ 
 DATA_ORDLOGIT_SAS.txt", clear 
*log using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 'Agec-
 server1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and  WTA\analysis\WTP\ 
 result_ologit_6TH_NOV.doc", replace text 
 
 
*** MARITAL STATUS ************************ 
  
 drop married 
*** Q43_MARITAL: 1= SINGLE; 2=DIVORSED; 3=MARRIED; 4=WIDOWED 
*** THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 2 
*** THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDUALS WITH 5 AND THESE ARE CODED AS 0 
***  
  
 *list q43_marital if q43_marital==5 
 
 gen married=1 if q43_marital==3  
 replace married = 0 if q43_marital!=3 
 replace married = . if q43_marital==. 
 *list married q43_marital 
 
*** SPOUCE-INCOME ************************** 
***  Q43_SPOUCEINCOME=1 IF SPOUCE HAS INCOME ELSE 0 
*** 
 *list q43_spouceincome if q43_spouceincome==1 
 
**********MARRIED*SPOUCEINCOME***************************************** 
 
 gen married_sincome=married*q43_spouceincome 
 *list married married_sincome q43_spouceincome 
 
*** ASSET LIABILTIY  ************************** 
 
*** Q43_ASSETIAB: 1=NO DEBT; 2=1-20%; 3=21-40%; 4=41-60%; 5=>60% 
*** THERE ARE 4 INDIVIDUALS THAT HAVE 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1 
*** 
 *list q43_assetliab if q43_assetliab==5 
  
 drop assetliab 
 gen assetliab=1 if q43_assetliab==0|q43_assetliab==1|q43_assetliab==2 
 replace assetliab=0 if 
 q43_assetliab==3|q43_assetliab==4|q43_assetliab==5 
 *list assetliab q43_assetliab 
 
**** OWNERSHIP ********************************* 
 
*** Q43_OWNERSHIP: 1=INDIVIDUAL; 2= FAMILY; 3=FATHER-SON; 4=OTHERS 
*** THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 3 
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*** THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDALS WITH 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1 
  
 *list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==3 
 gen ownership=1 if q43_ownership==0 
 replace ownership=1 if q43_ownership==1 
 replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==2 
 replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==4 
 replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==3 
 
*** OFF_FARM INCOME  ********************** 
 
*** Q43_OFFINCOME: 1= OWNER HAS OFF FARM INCOME TOO 
*** 
 *list q43_offincome if q43_offincome==1 
 
*** Q43_FARMINCOME **************************** 
 
*** Q43_FARMINCOME: 1= >100000 2=50000-99999; 3=0-49999; 4=LOSS <25000; 5= 
 LOSS 25000-50000; 6=LOSS>50000 
*** THERE ARE NO OBS ON 6 
*** 3 AND 4 ARE CHNAGED TO ONE CATEGORY TO MAKE EQUAL INTERVAL 
***  
 *list q43_farmincome if q43_farmincome==6 
  
 gen farm_income =1 if q43_farmincome==4 | q43_farmincome==5                
 replace farm_income =2 if q43_farmincome==3 
 replace farm_income=3 if q43_farmincome==2 
 replace farm_income =4 if q43_farmincome==1 
  
 *list farm_income q43_farmincome 
 
*** Q43_EDUCATION ****************************** 
 
*** Q43_EDUC: 1= > H SCHOOL; 2= HIGHSCHOOL; 3=COLLEGE; 4=UNDERGRAD; 
 5=GRADUATE; 6= VOCATIONAL  
*** THERE IS NO OBSERVATION ON 6 
***  
 drop educ 
 *list q43_educ if q43_educ==6 
 gen educ =1 if q43_educ==1 | q43_educ==2 
 replace educ=2 if q43_educ==3 | q43_educ==4 
 replace educ=3 if q43_educ==5 
 *list q43_educ educ 
 
*** Q43_HOUSING  ***************************** 
 *list q43_housing if q43_housing==1 
 
 
**** Q43_RETIRE  ***************************** 
 *list q43_retire if q43_retire==3 
 
**** Q43_PLANTOSP ***************************** 
*** Q40_PLANTOSP: 1=NONE; 2=<20000; 3= 20000-50000; 4= >50000 
*** 
 *list q40_plantosp if q40_plantosp==4  
 gen plantosp=1 if q40_plantosp==1  
 replace plantosp=2 if q40_plantosp==2 
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 replace plantosp=3 if q40_plantosp==3 
 replace plantosp=4 if q40_plantosp==4 
 *list plantosp if q40_plantosp==4 
 
 
*** Q2_BROILERNO  *********************** 
*** NUMBER OF BROIER IN 100,000 
*** 
 gen bn=q2_broilerno/100000 
 
 
*** Q43_PERS ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS *********** 
*** pay = Q43_PERS11-15= GOVT SHOULD PAY FARMERS FOR WATER CONSERVATION 
 PRACTICES 5=STONGLY AGREEE 
*** Q43_PERS16-20 = GOVT SHULDNOT BE INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURE 5=STONGLY 
 AGREEE 
*** Q43_PERS21-25 = GOVT INVOLVED IN AG HELPS FARMERS 5=STONGLY AGREEE 
*** Q43_PERS1-5 = LAWS AND REGULATION ARE BALY NEEDED 5=STONGLY AGREEE 
*** Q43_PERS5-10 = WATER CONSERVATION PRACTICES ARE OFTEN CARRIED TOO FAR 
 5=STONGLY AGREEE 
 
*** THERE IS ONE OBS WITH GOVT_PAY==6 THAT IS CHAGNED T0 5 
 
  
 egen reg_needed = rowtotal(q43_pers1-q43_pers5) 
 replace reg_needed =. if reg_needed ==0 
 
 egen prog_carried= rowtotal(q43_pers10-q43_pers15) 
 replace prog_carried=. if prog_carried==0 
 
 egen govt_pay = rowtotal(q43_pers11-q43_pers15) 
 replace govt_pay=5 if govt_pay==6 
 replace govt_pay =. if govt_pay==0 
 
 egen govt_inv=rowtotal(q43_pers16-q43_pers20) 
 replace govt_inv =. if govt_inv==0 
 
 egen govt_ag = rowtotal(q43_pers21-q43_pers25) 
 replace govt_ag=. if govt_ag==0 
 
*** EDUC * OFFINCOME  ********************** 
 gen offinc_educ=q43_offincome*educ 
 
 list q27_d1 q29_maxwtp  if q27_d1==. & q29_maxwtp != . 
 replace q27_d1=1 if q27_d1==. & q29_maxwtp != . 
  
*** SUMMARY STATISTICS **************************** 
 
Corr  q27_d1 bn per_own wtp per_littuse q19_litterprodn q30_bmp 
 q40_plantosp q41_year q43_exper q43_age q43_firmage q43_educ q43_gender 
 q43_marital q43_offincome q43_spouceincome q43_farmincome q43_assetliab 
 q43_retire q43_housing q43_worth q43_perstotal q44_contact 
sum  q27_d1 broilerno per_own wtp per_littuse q19_litterprodn q30_bmp q39_e 
 q39_b q39_m q40_plantosp q41_year q42_relative q43_exper q43_age 
 q43_firmage q43_educ q43_gender q43_marital q43_offincome 
 q43_spouceincome q43_farmincome q43_assetliab q43_retire q43_housing 
 q43_worth q43_perstotal q44_contact married married_sincome 
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xi:  stepwise, pr(.25): ologit q27_d1 bn reg_needed prog_carried per_own 
 per_littuse q30_bmp q40_plantosp q41_year q43_exper q43_age farm_income 
 i.educ q43_gender q43_marital q43_offincome q43_spouceincome 
 q43_assetliab q43_housing q43_worth q43_perstotal q44_contact govt_pay 
xi:  omodel logit q27_d1 q43_age govt_pay q43_perstotal i.educ per_littuse 
 q43_offincome i.plantosp 
 
*** ORDERED LOGIT   
  
xi: sum q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse q44_contact 
 reg_needed 
 tab educ  
 tab q27_d1  
 
xi:  ologit q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse q44_contact 
 reg_needed, robust 
 mfx,  predict(outcome(3)) 
 mfx,  predict(outcome(2)) 
 mfx,  predict(outcome(1)) 
  
xi:  omodel logit q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse 
 q44_contact reg_needed 
xi:  gologit2 q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse q44_contact 
 reg_needed, autofit(0.1) lrforce robust 
 mfx2 
*****  BELOW IS THE ANALYSIS FOR INTERVAL REGRESSION MODELS  
 gen q27_d1down=0 if q27_d1==1 
 gen q27_d1up =299 if q27_d1==1 
 replace q27_d1down=300 if q27_d1==2 
 replace q27_d1up =499 if q27_d1==2 
 replace q27_d1down=500 if q27_d1==3 
 replace q27_d1up =. if q27_d1==3 
 list q27_d1 q27_d q27_d1down q27_d1up 
 
 
xi:  intreg q27_d1down q27_d1up i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse 
 q44_contact reg_needed, robust 
 fitstat 
 predict yhat 
 
sum yhat 
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